G.R. No. L-15759, December 30, 1961
PAMPANGA BUS COMPANY, INC. and LA MALLORCA, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF TARLAC, PROVINCE OF TARLAC, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The plaintiffs, Pampanga Bus Company and La Mallorca, are public utility operators authorized by the Public Service Commission to operate buses in Tarlac. They jointly own and operate a bus terminal made of strong materials on F. Tañedo Street. The Municipal Council of Tarlac enacted Ordinance No. 1, which prohibited the establishment of bus or freight terminals along a specified segment of F. Tañedo Street and required existing terminals in that area to relocate within thirty days. This ordinance was subsequently disapproved by the Provincial Board. Later, the Municipal Council passed Resolution No. 323, ordering the plaintiffs to remove and transfer their bus terminal within ten days. The plaintiffs filed an action to declare these enactments null and void, alleging they were enacted beyond the municipality’s powers, were unreasonable, discriminatory, and oppressive, and that their terminal was not a nuisance.
The defendant Municipality contended that the ordinance was a valid exercise of its police power under various statutes, including the Revised Administrative Code and the Public Service Act. It argued the terminal constituted a public nuisance because the buses going in and out caused traffic obstruction and safety hazards on a busy street. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance and resolution.

ISSUE

Whether Ordinance No. 1 and Resolution No. 323 of the Municipality of Tarlac are valid exercises of municipal power.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment declaring the ordinance and resolution null and void. The Court held that the ordinance was not a valid zoning regulation. A zoning ordinance properly involves the division of a municipality into districts and the regulation of property uses within those districts to serve the general welfare. Ordinance No. 1 contained no such classification; it merely mandated the removal of terminals from a specific street without establishing any residential, industrial, or other zones. Therefore, it lacked a rational basis as a zoning measure.
The Court also rejected the municipality’s claim that the terminal was a nuisance per se or per accidens that could be summarily abated. The trial court found the terminal was a sturdy structure with modern facilities and that traffic congestion was caused by other vehicles making U-turns and loading passengers on the street, not specifically by the plaintiffs’ buses entering or exiting the terminal. The abatement of a nuisance must follow the procedures under the Civil Code, which the municipality failed to do.
Furthermore, while municipalities have authority under the Public Service Act and the Revised Motor Vehicle Law to promulgate regulations for public utilities and garages, such regulations must be valid and lawful and cannot constitute an unwarranted curtailment of legitimate property rights. The ordinance was an unlawful encroachment on such rights, being discriminatory, unreasonable, and oppressive, as it targeted the plaintiffs’ existing lawful business without a substantial relation to public health, safety, or welfare. The writ of preliminary injunction was made permanent.