GR L 15638; (April, 1962) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-15638; April 26, 1962
IN RE PETITION FOR CONTEMPT AGAINST FRANCISCO F. GONZALES IV. HERMOGENES CONCEPCION, JR., petitioner-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO F. GONZALES IV, respondent-appellant.
FACTS
The City Fiscal of Manila, in connection with a criminal case already filed in court (People v. Secretary Jaime Hernandez), issued a subpoena duces tecum to Francisco F. Gonzales IV as corporate secretary of Avegon, Inc., demanding the production of corporate books and records. Gonzales failed to comply. Consequently, the City Fiscal petitioned the Court of First Instance of Manila to cite Gonzales for contempt. The lower court found Gonzales guilty, imposing a fine and ordering him to produce the documents before the Fiscal.
Gonzales appealed, contending the City Fiscal lacked authority to issue the subpoena. He argued that the Fiscal’s subpoena power, under the Manila Charter (Sec. 38-B, R.A. No. 409 , as amended), is confined to the preliminary investigation stage of a case. Since an information had already been filed and the case was pending in court, he asserted that any subpoena for trial preparation should be issued by the court itself, not the prosecuting fiscal.
ISSUE
Whether the City Fiscal of Manila has the legal authority to issue a subpoena duces tecum in a criminal case already pending trial in court.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the contempt judgment and exonerated Gonzales. The Court’s legal logic centered on a strict statutory interpretation of the City Fiscal’s subpoena powers. The applicable law, Section 38-B of the Revised Charter of Manila, grants the Fiscal the power to issue subpoenas to summon witnesses and evidence specifically “for the purpose” of conducting investigations into charges of crimes and violations. This power is substantially identical to that of provincial fiscals under the Revised Administrative Code, which is limited to the preliminary investigation phase.
The Court held that once a criminal information is filed, the preliminary investigation concludes, and the case passes to the court’s jurisdiction. At that stage, the authority to compel the production of evidence via subpoena belongs exclusively to the court trying the case. The subpoena in question was issued after the information was filed, with no showing that a re-investigation had been properly initiated. The Court found the Fiscal’s purpose unclear and noted that obtaining evidence for trial preparation is a function properly addressed to the court. Given the dubious legality of the Fiscal’s act and the principle that contempt, being quasi-criminal, requires any doubt to be resolved in favor of the respondent, the Court ruled the subpoena was issued without authority. Gonzales’s prior compliance during the preliminary investigation further negated any contumacious intent.
