G.R. No. L-15548 October 30, 1962
JOSE KABIGTING, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent-appellant.

FACTS

Jose Kabigting, convicted in nineteen criminal cases, filed his third petition for habeas corpus, alleging he had overserved his sentences. His second petition (G.R. No. L-12276) was previously decided by the Supreme Court, which computed his unserved balance and remanded the case for determination of good conduct time allowances. The Director of Prisons reported that Kabigting’s allowances were insufficient for release, leading to the dismissal of that second petition. Despite this final judgment, Kabigting filed a third petition in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, reasserting the same claim of completed service.
The trial court, Judge Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, forwarded the case to the Supreme Court. The Court returned the records for decision, attaching a resolution warning against successive petitions rehashing decided points. Nevertheless, the trial court proceeded to grant the writ, ordering Kabigting’s release. He was released on a Saturday afternoon after the decision was promulgated. The Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal the following Monday morning and moved for Kabigting’s re-arrest. The trial court granted the appeal, ordered re-arrest, but allowed bail.

ISSUE

The primary issues are: (1) whether the appeal was timely filed; (2) whether the release was lawful; and (3) whether the trial court could disregard the Supreme Court’s final judgment in the previous habeas corpus case.

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled the appeal was timely. Respondent received the decision on a Saturday afternoon. Under the Rules of Court, the period to appeal excludes the day of notice and any intervening Sunday. Therefore, the appeal filed on Monday morning was within the 24-hour period prescribed for habeas corpus cases.
The release was premature and illegal. Under Section 20, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, a judgment releasing a detainee is not effective until the detaining officer is given an opportunity to appeal. An appeal by such officer stays the release order unless the detainee posts a bond. Here, the release was effected immediately without allowing the statutory opportunity for appeal.
Most critically, the trial court’s decision granting the writ was a grave error. The Supreme Court’s decision in G.R. No. L-12276 constituted the final and binding “law of the case” regarding the computation of Kabigting’s prison term and his entitlement to release. A final judgment from the Supreme Court is binding on all inferior courts, which have no authority to alter or modify it. The trial court disregarded this fundamental principle and the Court’s explicit resolution warning against successive applications on the same grounds. Kabigting’s proper remedy was a motion for reconsideration of the Supreme Court’s prior decision, not a new petition in a lower court. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the release order, affirmed the orders for re-arrest and increased bail, and ordered Kabigting’s recommitment to serve his unexpired term per the final judgment in G.R. No. L-12276.