G.R. No. L-15537; June 30, 1962
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., represented by Gregorio Araneta, Inc., plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE RAFOR, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Plaintiff J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., the registered owner of a parcel of land in Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1267, filed an action for ejectment and damages against defendant Jose Rafor. The complaint alleged that in 1950, Rafor, through force, strategy, and stealth, unlawfully entered a portion of the land, constructed two houses, and deprived Tuason of possession, causing damages equivalent to the fair rental value. Tuason prayed for Rafor’s eviction, removal of improvements, and payment of monthly rentals.
In his answer, Rafor claimed ownership through a chain of title originating from Telesforo Deudor since 1873, asserting he purchased a portion from Agustin Torres in 1949 and had been in continuous, adverse possession. He attacked the validity of Tuason’s Torrens title, alleging it was derived from a void original certificate. Rafor further contended that a prior compromise agreement between Tuason and Rafor’s supposed predecessors-in-interest, which ceded rights to Tuason, was executed without his knowledge and constituted a sale that made Tuason a buyer in bad faith. On the eve of the trial, Rafor filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of lis pendens, citing another pending case (Civil Case No. Q-4057) filed by Rufina Guerrero against Tuason.

ISSUE

The primary issues were: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Rafor’s belated motion to dismiss based on lis pendens; and (2) whether Rafor could be considered a builder in good faith entitled to rights over his constructions.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. On the first issue, the Court held the motion to dismiss was correctly denied for being filed out of time. Under the Rules of Court, such a motion must be filed within the time for pleading, i.e., when the answer is due. Rafor filed his motion 25 days after submitting his answer and on the eve of the trial, making it procedurally improper. Substantively, the requisites for lis pendens were not met. Even assuming the parties in the two cases represented the same interests, the fourth requisite—that a judgment in the first case would constitute res judicata in the second—was absent. A victory for Tuason in the other case would not automatically resolve Rafor’s liability for unlawful detention in this action; thus, the two suits could proceed independently.
On the second issue, Rafor’s claim of being a builder in good faith raised a question of fact. Since his appeal was expressly limited to questions of law, the Supreme Court was bound by the trial court’s factual findings. The decision contained no basis to support Rafor’s claim of good faith. Consequently, the order for him to vacate, remove improvements, and pay rentals was upheld. The judgment was affirmed in all respects.