GR L 1536; (July, 1947) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-1536; July 31, 1947
RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner, vs. SOTERO RODAS, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and LUIS B. REYES, Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Ricardo Parulan filed a petition for certiorari seeking relief from an order of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The order denied Parulan’s motion to quash the information filed in Criminal Case No. 3649, as well as his motion for reconsideration. The information charged the accused with a complex crime. The Supreme Court initially dismissed the petition via a resolution dated July 11, 1947, holding that the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction over the complex offense of kidnapping with murder as charged. Parulan filed a motion for reconsideration of that dismissal.
ISSUE
Whether the facts alleged in the information constitute a single complex crime of kidnapping with murder (where kidnapping is a necessary means to commit murder), thereby vesting jurisdiction in the Court of First Instance of Manila from where the victim was kidnapped.
RULING
The Supreme Court, in its resolution on the motion for reconsideration, DENIED the motion and affirmed its prior dismissal of the petition.
The Court held that the crime charged is indeed a complex crime of kidnapping and murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of whether two offenses constitute a complex crime depends on the facts alleged in the information, specifically whether one offense was committed as a necessary means to commit the other.
The information alleged that the accused, for the purpose of extorting ransom or killing the victim if ransom was not paid, kidnapped him in Manila, carried him away, detained him, and later took him to an uninhabited place where they killed him. The Court found that from these allegations, the kidnapping was a necessary means to commit the murder. The accused had to kidnap and take the victim to a faraway, secluded place to better secure ransom through fear and to kill him with a sense of impunity and certainty of avoiding witnesses if he refused to pay. Since the murder was the ultimate objective contingent on the failure to obtain ransom, the kidnapping served as the necessary means to achieve it.
Consequently, as a complex crime, the Court of First Instance of any province where any essential element of the offense was committed has jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court of First Instance of Manila, from where the victim was kidnapped, properly acquired jurisdiction over the entire complex offense.
DISSENTING OPINIONS:
* Justice Perfecto (dissenting): Voted to grant the motion. He argued the information charged two independent crimes: kidnapping for ransom and murder. Kidnapping was not a necessary means for murder, as it was committed “for the purpose of extorting ransom”—a purpose incompatible with murder. Failure to get ransom is a motive, not a means.
* Justice Tuason (dissenting): Agreed with denying the petition but on the procedural ground that certiorari does not lie against an interlocutory order. On the merits, he disagreed with the majority, contending the information charged distinct offenses. He argued kidnapping for ransom is itself a complex crime (kidnapping as a means for extortion) and cannot be a means to murder to create a “super-complex” crime. He emphasized that joining kidnapping with murder as one complex crime would mandatorily impose the death penalty upon conviction, unlike if they were tried separately.
