G.R. No. L-15338; April 28, 1962
CALTEX EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-PAFLU, petitioner, vs. THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO LUCERO, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

The Caltex Employees Association-PAFLU delivered a strike notice on March 25, 1959. Due to the Holy Week holidays, the Conciliation Service officially recorded it only on March 30, 1959. During subsequent conciliation conferences, the union asserted its right to strike 30 days from March 25, threatening to strike after April 23. The company, Caltex (Philippines) Inc., contended the 30-day cooling-off period under Republic Act No. 875 should commence on March 30, a position later upheld by the Undersecretary of Labor. Anticipating a strike it deemed unlawful for occurring within the disputed cooling-off period, the company filed a petition for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The company requested an ex parte restraining order, alleging substantial and irreparable injury to its property. On April 23, 1959, the respondent court, after taking testimonies from company witnesses, issued the restraining order, prohibiting the union from striking before April 30 upon the posting of a bond. The union’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting it to elevate the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing an ex parte restraining order to prevent a threatened strike.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the restraining order. The legal logic is anchored on the strict statutory limitations imposed by Republic Act No. 875 , the Industrial Peace Act. The Court emphasized that under Section 9(a) of the Act, no court possesses jurisdiction to issue any restraining order in a case growing out of a labor dispute to prohibit persons from ceasing or refusing to work. The sole statutory exception is when the President certifies a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to the national interest to the Court of Industrial Relations, which did not apply here.
Even assuming a restraining order could be issued against a potentially unlawful strike to prevent irreparable injury, the procedural mandates of Section 9(d) of the Act are absolute prerequisites. These requirements include a hearing with due notice to all parties, an opportunity to present witnesses and conduct cross-examination, and a specific finding that public officers are unable or unwilling to protect the employer’s property. The Court held that the ex parte procedure utilized by the respondent court, which relied solely on the company’s evidence without affording the union a hearing, constituted a direct violation of these mandatory procedural safeguards. Consequently, the issuance of the restraining order was illegal and issued in grave abuse of discretion.