G.R. No. L-14904; August 29, 1960
CONSUELO ARRANZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. VENERACION BARBERS ARRANZ, oppositor and appellant. ABELARDO ARRANZ, petitioner-appellee.

FACTS

Upon petition of Consuelo Arranz, Abelardo Arranz, Estela Arranz Tabora, Melecio Arranz, Jr., and Josefina Arranz, the Court of First Instance of Cagayan issued an order on June 6, 1955, directing the Register of Deeds to annotate on Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1339 that Josefina Arranz was of age, that Melecio Arranz, Jr. was married to Soledad Guidote, and that the shares of the petitioners were the exclusive, individual, or paraphernal property of each. On July 29, 1955, Veneracion Barbers Arranz, the wife of petitioner Abelardo Arranz, filed a motion for new trial, seeking to set aside the June 6 order regarding Abelardo’s share, claiming it was her exclusive paraphernal property. The court granted the motion, setting aside the order as to Abelardo’s share and reopening the hearing. The hearing was set for November 22, 1955, but was postponed at Veneracion’s request, with a court admonition against further postponements. A second hearing set for January 12, 1956, was also postponed at her request, with a similar warning. The case was then set for February 25, 1956. On that date, neither Veneracion nor her counsel appeared. Consequently, on February 27, 1956, the court issued an order reviving its original June 6, 1955 order. The next day, February 28, Veneracion filed a petition for relief, asking the court to set aside the February 27 order and reopen the case to allow her to present evidence.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Veneracion Barbers Arranz’s petition for relief from the order reviving the original June 6, 1955 decree, based on her counsel’s failure to appear at the scheduled hearing.

RULING

No, the trial court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order denying the petition for relief. The Court found that the excuses offered by oppositor-appellant’s counsel for his non-appearance on February 25, 1956, were insufficient. Counsel claimed he was only informed on the afternoon of February 24 that he would handle the trial the next morning; that traveling at night was dangerous, so he waited until morning; and that he could not get transportation until about 10:00 a.m., at which time he sent a telegram requesting postponement, arriving in court at 11:00 a.m. to find the case submitted for decision. The Supreme Court held that no adequate excuse was given for transferring the case’s conduct to another lawyer only the day before the hearing. Furthermore, counsel failed to exercise due diligence. He could have proceeded to the court location on the day he was informed, despite the alleged danger of night travel, or could have sent his request for postponement in ample time instead of waiting until the last moment. The oppositor-appellant failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion, which is essential for granting such relief. The order was affirmed, without prejudice to the appellant pursuing any other legal remedies available to her.