G.R. No. L-14803. June 30, 1961.
FLAVIANO LOTA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and MOISES SANGALANG, respondents.

FACTS

Moises Sangalang had been discharging the duties of caretaker for the municipal cemetery of Taal, Batangas, since 1951. On June 30, 1955, the local Health Officer, Dr. Gregorio M. Noche, extended a new appointment to Sangalang under Section 2199 of the Revised Administrative Code, effective July 1, 1955, seemingly to enable a salary increase. This appointment, initially lacking the required favorable recommendation from the incumbent municipal mayor, was later secured in March 1956 from the former mayor, Dr. Ignacio Ilagan. The appointment was subsequently approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service. However, on February 13, 1956, petitioner Mayor Flaviano Lota appointed Jose Sangalang to the same position, ousting Moises Sangalang. Sangalang filed an action in the Court of First Instance, which ruled in his favor, declaring his appointment legal, ousting Jose Sangalang, and ordering payment of back salaries and damages. Only Mayor Lota appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s declaration that Sangalang was entitled to hold the office.

ISSUE

The primary issues were: (1) whether the action filed by Sangalang was properly one for quo warranto or mandamus; (2) whether the Municipality of Taal was an indispensable party whose non-joinder warranted dismissal; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals correctly declared Sangalang entitled to hold the office of cemetery caretaker.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. First, the action was correctly characterized as quo warranto. The Court distinguished the remedies: quo warranto is the proper action to try the right to an office and to oust a usurper, while mandamus lies to enforce a clear legal duty. Here, the core dispute involved a challenge to Sangalang’s title to the office and the alleged unlawful intrusion by Jose Sangalang, making quo warranto the appropriate remedy, with mandamus being merely ancillary for the enforcement of payment of salaries.
Second, the Municipality of Taal was not an indispensable party. The Court distinguished the present case from Kho vs. Rodriguez, cited by the petitioner, which involved a mandamus action for salary payment where the city’s appropriation of funds was directly at issue. In this quo warranto proceeding, the controversy centered on the right to the office between two claimants, and the municipality had no direct interest in that determination. The duty to reinstate and pay salaries fell upon the municipal officials who were already parties to the suit.
Third, the declaration that Sangalang was entitled to the office was correct. Based on the facts binding upon the Supreme Court, Sangalang was a de facto officer from 1951 under a presumably valid appointment. His 1955 appointment, though procedurally delayed, was ultimately approved. The appointing power for the position resided in the local health officer, with the mayor having only recommendatory and limited disciplinary authority. Mayor Lota had no power to dismiss Sangalang without cause or to make a valid appointment to an occupied position. No formal charges or cause for dismissal were shown. Therefore, Sangalang’s ouster was unlawful, and he was entitled to reinstatement.