GR L 14791; (May, 1963) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-14791; May 30, 1963
IPEKDJIAN MERCHANDISING CO., INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
FACTS
On January 11, 1951, the Collector of Internal Revenue assessed petitioner Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. compensating taxes and a penalty for imported gold chains converted into bullion. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA), which affirmed the assessment. Petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court, but the appeal was dismissed without prejudice on March 30, 1954, and this dismissal became final. Subsequent attempts to reinstate or reopen the appeal were denied. On November 3, 1955, petitioner made a partial payment of P5,000.00. On February 26, 1958, the Commissioner filed a motion for execution of the BTA’s judgment for the balance before the newly created Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA granted the motion and ordered issuance of the writ.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Tax Appeals had jurisdiction to grant the motion for execution of the final and executory judgment rendered by the abolished Board of Tax Appeals.
RULING
Yes, the CTA had jurisdiction. The legal logic centers on the transitional provisions of Republic Act No. 1125 , which created the CTA and abolished the BTA. Section 21 of RA 1125 provided that all cases pending in the BTA upon the law’s effectivity on June 16, 1954, shall be transferred to and decided by the CTA. Although the BTA was an administrative body, RA 1125 conferred judicial character upon its proceedings and decisions. The Court held that BTA Case No. 10, having been appealed to and dismissed by the Supreme Court prior to June 16, 1954, with that dismissal becoming final, was a “case heretofore decided” by the BTA. Consequently, its final and executory judgment received judicial confirmation under the statute.
The Court rejected petitioner’s argument that execution required a separate court action. It reasoned that the judicial power would be incomplete if a final judgment could not be executed. The automatic transfer of the BTA’s administrative records to the CTA included this final judgment. The CTA, as the successor tribunal vested with judicial functions over tax matters, possessed the inherent and implied authority to order execution to give effect to that final judgment. Distinguishing cited cases involving other administrative bodies, the Court emphasized the BTA’s adjudicatory powers and the absence of a statutory requirement for a separate enforcement action. Thus, the CTA properly granted the motion for execution.