G.R. No. L-14487. April 29, 1960.
LEVY HERMANOS, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. DIEGO PEREZ, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

Plaintiff Levy Hermanos, Inc. filed a complaint in the Municipal Court of Bacolod City on July 18, 1956, which was later reproduced in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental on April 18, 1958, after defendant Diego Perez appealed the inferior court’s decision. The complaint sought to enforce a judgment rendered on August 23, 1941, in Civil Case No. 8784, sentencing Perez to pay P1,045.33 with interest. A Packard car was levied and sold at public auction on January 28, 1942, with the proceeds applied to the debt, leaving an unpaid balance of P957.47. The defendant refused to pay despite demands. Instead of answering, Perez filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, arguing that from September 23, 1941 (when the judgment became final) to July 18, 1956 (when the complaint was filed), more than the 10-year prescriptive period had elapsed. The lower court, computing the elapsed time from August 23, 1941, to April 18, 1958, as 16 years, 7 months, and 25 days, and holding that the Debt Moratorium Law was in force only from March 10, 1945, to July 26, 1948 (3 years, 4 months, and 16 days), dismissed the complaint on June 2, 1958. Plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription without a trial to determine if the defendant was a war sufferer, which would affect the computation of the prescriptive period under the Debt Moratorium Law.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. An action upon a judgment must be filed within ten years from the date it became final (Articles 1144 and 1152, Civil Code). Here, the judgment became final on September 23, 1941, and the action was filed on July 18, 1956, resulting in an elapsed period of 14 years, 9 months, and 25 days. However, the Court held that for a war sufferer, the Debt Moratorium Law was in force from March 10, 1945, to May 18, 1953—a period of over 8 years—suspending the statute of limitations for that duration (citing Tioseco vs. Day, et al., G.R. No. L-9944, April 30, 1957). Plaintiff-appellant claimed that defendant-appellee did not deny filing a claim with the War Damage Commission, indicating he was a war sufferer, but the lower court’s order lacked findings to verify this. Since the ground of prescription was not indubitable, the lower court should have deferred action on the motion to dismiss until after trial on the merits to determine if the defendant was a war sufferer and to compute the prescriptive period accordingly (Rule 8, section 3, Rules of Court; Cordova, et al. vs. Cordova, et al., G.R. No. L-9936, January 14, 1958).