G.R. No. L-14474; October 31, 1960
ONESIMA D. BELEN, petitioner-appellant, vs. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA, oppositors-appellees.

FACTS

Benigno Diaz executed a codicil to his will on September 29, 1944. Paragraph 10 of the codicil provided that after a period of 10 or 15 years from his death, the proceeds from the sale of his properties, after deductions, would be distributed to named persons, including Filomena Diaz (10%), “o a sus descendientes legitimos” (or to their legitimate descendants). Benigno Diaz died on November 7, 1944, and his will and codicil were probated. The estate was later placed under the trusteeship of the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children: Milagros Belen de Olaguera (married, with seven legitimate children) and Onesima D. Belen (single). On March 19, 1958, Onesima Belen filed a petition in the probate proceedings, contending that Filomena Diaz’s 10% share under the codicil should be divided equally only between herself and her sister Milagros, to the exclusion of Milagros’s seven children (the grandchildren of Filomena Diaz). The Court of First Instance of Manila denied her petition, ruling that the term “descendientes legitimos” includes all legitimate descendants (children and grandchildren) of Filomena Diaz, not merely the nearest in degree.

ISSUE

Whether the phrase “sus descendientes legitimos” (their legitimate descendants) in the codicil of Benigno Diaz refers only to the descendants nearest in degree to the original legatee (Filomena Diaz)—i.e., her two children—or conjointly to all her living legitimate descendants as a class, including grandchildren.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order. The phrase “sus descendientes legitimos” in the codicil constitutes a simple substitution (sustitucion vulgar) under Article 860 of the Civil Code, where the testator designated a plurality of substitutes for each legatee. The Court held that the term refers to all legitimate descendants of the original legatee as a class, not only those nearest in degree. Appellant’s reliance on Article 959 of the Civil Code (which states that a distribution in favor of the testator’s relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree) is misplaced, as that article applies only when the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not relatives of a legatee. The rationale of Article 959—that among a testator’s relatives, the closest are presumed dearest—does not extend to beneficiaries who are relatives of a legatee. The testator here envisioned all descendants of the legatee as a group of substitutes. In the absence of a contrary intent, the legacy should be divided per capita among all surviving legitimate descendants (children and grandchildren) of Filomena Diaz, in accordance with Article 846 of the Civil Code. Thus, the 10% share of Filomena Diaz is to be distributed equally among her two children and her seven grandchildren.