G.R. No. L-14363; August 31, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARIDAD CAPISTRANO, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

1. On October 6, 1956, Caridad Capistrano was charged in Criminal Case No. 3881-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal for violation of Central Bank Circulars. The information alleged that on March 31, 1955, at the Manila International Airport, she, an outgoing Philippine resident bound for Hong Kong, willfully and unlawfully had in her possession and concealed in her person (in a sanitary pad) 100 pieces of fifty-peso bills totaling P5,000.00.
2. The defendant moved to quash the information, which was denied. She pleaded not guilty. During trial, she admitted the facts but contended they did not constitute a crime. The trial court convicted her.
3. On appeal (G.R. No. L-12724), the Supreme Court reversed the conviction and acquitted Capistrano. The Court held the information was insufficient because it failed to allege an essential element: that she took or was about to take the currency out of the Philippines without the necessary license from the Central Bank. The omission meant the charge did not constitute an offense. The decision became final, and the confiscated money was ordered returned.
4. After this acquittal, on about May 23, 1958, the Provincial Fiscal filed a new information (Criminal Case No. 4366-P) for the same incident. This new information contained identical factual allegations but added the crucial missing element: that she possessed the 156 pieces of fifty-peso bills (now totaling P7,800.00) “without having declared the same in the Central Bank currency form and without first securing the necessary license and/or permit to export the same from the Central Bank of the Philippines or any of its authorized agents.”
5. Capistrano moved to quash the new information on the ground of double jeopardy. The motion was denied. She pleaded not guilty, admitted the allegations, but maintained the act did not constitute a crime. The trial court found her guilty of violating Circular No. 60, Section 2(a) (not Section 1(b) as designated in the information) in relation to Republic Act No. 265 , sentencing her to 15 days imprisonment, a P1,000 fine, and forfeiture of the currency. She appealed, insisting double jeopardy barred the second prosecution.

ISSUE

Whether the second prosecution of Caridad Capistrano under the new information constitutes double jeopardy, thereby barring the trial and conviction.

RULING

No, the second prosecution does not constitute double jeopardy. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
The Court applied Section 9, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which states that for a former judgment to bar a subsequent prosecution, it must be rendered: (a) by a court of competent jurisdiction; (b) upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (c) after arraignment; and (d) after the defendant had pleaded to the charge. The second prosecution must be for the same offense, an attempt or frustration thereof, or an offense that necessarily includes or is included in the first charge.
The Court held that the first information in G.R. No. L-12724 was insufficient in substance because it omitted the essential allegation that the exportation was without the necessary Central Bank license. As the Supreme Court explicitly ruled in that prior case, this omission meant the charge was “insufficient to constitute an offense.” Consequently, the defendant was never in legal jeopardy in the first prosecution. Since no valid offense was charged initially, the acquittal therein did not bar a new prosecution based on a properly pleaded information that includes all the elements of the crime.
Therefore, the defense of double jeopardy is untenable. The decision of the trial court convicting Caridad Capistrano was affirmed.