G.R. No. L-14323. April 29, 1960.
ANTERO SORIANO, JR., petitioner-appellant, vs. EMILIO L. GALANG, Commissioner of Immigration, respondent-appellee.

FACTS

Petitioner Antero Soriano, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Manila to challenge the order of respondent Commissioner of Immigration Emilio L. Galang confiscating a cash bond in the amount of P2,000. The bond was executed by Soriano on behalf of alien temporary visitor Ngo Tiong Kian. The petition alleged that Soriano filed a cash bond for Ngo Tiong Kian’s release in September 1950 and another bond on July 30, 1956. On November 26, 1956, the respondent declared the bond forfeited on the ground that Ngo Tiong Kian had engaged in gainful employment without the required written permission, in violation of the conditions of his temporary stay. Soriano moved for reconsideration, arguing that the charge was not established in a proper proceeding, no condition of the cash bond was violated to warrant forfeiture, and the confiscation was made without a hearing. The respondent denied the motion. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that the power to allow bonds and order their confiscation rests exclusively within the Commissioner’s sound discretion and that certiorari does not lie to attack such acts. Soriano appealed.
The respondent’s answer admitted that Soriano filed a P2,000 bond for Ngo Tiong Kian’s temporary stay on September 28, 1950 (Annex “1” to the Answer), which contained a condition (g) that the alien shall not be employed nor engage in any business without the Commissioner’s prior written consent. The respondent stated that upon investigation, Ngo Tiong Kian was found to have been employed without permission (as a store attendant at Bingo Trading, Manila) and that the bond confiscated was the 1950 bond, not the 1956 bond (Annex “A” to the petition). The 1956 bond was for “temporary release pending deportation proceedings.” The trial was based on the pleadings and exhibits without additional evidence.

ISSUE

1. Whether the respondent Commissioner had the power to confiscate the cash bond.
2. Whether the remedy of certiorari is proper to contest the confiscation.
3. Whether the court should review and nullify the order of forfeiture.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition.
1. On the power to confiscate the bond: The Court held that the bond confiscated was the 1950 bond (Annex “1”), not the 1956 bond (Annex “A”). The 1950 bond was for temporary admission and expressly prohibited the alien from being employed or engaging in any business without the Commissioner’s written consent. It was not denied that Ngo Tiong Kian was employed as a store attendant, constituting a breach of this condition. The confiscation was pursuant to Section 40 of the Immigration Act of 1940 ( Commonwealth Act No. 613 ), which authorizes forfeiture upon breach of bond conditions. The Court rejected the argument that the 1956 bond superseded the 1950 bond, explaining that they were different: the 1950 bond was for temporary admission, while the 1956 bond was for temporary release pending deportation proceedings.
2. On the propriety of certiorari: The Court held that certiorari does not lie. Certiorari under Rule 67 (now Rule 65) is available only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions. The Commissioner’s act of confiscating the bond was not an exercise of judicial functions; thus, certiorari was not the proper remedy to question its validity.
3. On the review of the forfeiture order: The Court found no error in the trial court’s refusal to review and nullify the order. Apart from the above reasons, the Court noted that the petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Commissioner of Immigration is under the control and supervision of the Secretary of Justice. If the petitioner believed the Commissioner committed a grave abuse of discretion, he should have first appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Having failed to do so, the petition for certiorari was prematurely filed. The Court cited precedents requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before resorting to judicial action.
The appealed judgment was affirmed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.