G.R. No. L-1419, L-1420, L-1421; July 31, 1947
Rosario Oching, et al., petitioners, vs. Sotero Rodas, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and Bartolome San Diego, respondents.

(Consolidated with G.R. No. L-1420, M.C. de Salvacion, et al., petitioners, vs. Sotero Rodas, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and Bartolome San Diego, respondents.; and G.R. No. L-1421, Dionisia Abueg, et al., petitioners, vs. Sotero Rodas, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and Bartolome San Diego, respondents.)

FACTS

The petitioners obtained final and executory monetary judgments against respondent Bartolome San Diego under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. They moved for the execution of these judgments. San Diego opposed the motion by invoking the debt moratorium established by Executive Order No. 25, as amended by Executive Order No. 32. The respondent Judge, Honorable Sotero Rodas, denied the motion for execution based on this plea.

ISSUE

The sole issue is whether the debt moratorium under Executive Order No. 32 applies to suspend the execution of monetary judgments obtained under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

RULING

The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion, ruled that the debt moratorium applies and denied the petition.
The pertinent provision of Executive Order No. 32 suspends the enforcement of payment of “all debts and other monetary obligations,” with an exception only for those entered into in areas already declared liberated from enemy occupation. The Court held that this provision is “very comprehensive and evinces no intent to make any exceptions, save as to the time the debt was incurred.” It is plain and unambiguous, embracing “all debts and other monetary obligations” regardless of their source, the creditor’s indigence, or the debtor’s ability to pay. The Court cited settled jurisprudence (Palacios vs. Daza and Tarnate vs. Daza) that the moratorium suspends execution of money judgments. The Court found the argument that obligations under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be excluded untenable. While expressing sympathy for the petitioners, the Court stated their remedy did not lie with the judiciary.
SEPARATE OPINIONS:
DISSENT (Hilado, J., with whom Moran, C.J., Pablo, M., and Perfecto, JJ., concurred):
The dissent argued for granting the petition on several grounds:
1. The Workmen’s Compensation Act implements the constitutional principle of social justice. The moratorium orders should not be construed to deviate from or nullify this national policy, especially given the priority granted to compensation claims by the Act.
2. Following the doctrine in Tarnate vs. Daza, the obligation here was created by the Supreme Court’s final judgment of December 17, 1946. Under principles of merger, the judgment itself constitutes a new debt. Since the entire Philippines was liberated by that date, the obligation fell under the moratorium’s exception for post-liberation debts.
3. The nature of the claim differed from a conventional debt. Before judgment, it was an unliquidated claim where the amount payable was uncertain and dependent on judicial determination, unlike a definite contractual debt.
4. Compensation is an item in the cost of production that a well-managed industry budgets for and should not be deemed included in the moratorium.
DISSENT (Perfecto, J.):
Justice Perfecto added that San Diego waived his right to invoke the moratorium by actively litigating the cases to a final Supreme Court decision without raising the defense. He only invoked it after the judgment became final and an order of execution was issued. Furthermore, the moratorium does not apply to obligations created by law, such as workmen’s compensation, which is a measure of social justice for laborers. An executive order cannot impliedly repeal such a law.