GR L 14116; (June, 1960) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-14116; June 30, 1960 (Resolution: January 20, 1961)
LAUREANA A. CID, petitioner, vs. IRENE P. JAVIER, MANUEL P. JAVIER, JOSEFINA P. JAVIER, FERNANDO P. JAVIER, JOSE P. JAVIER, GUILLERMO P. JAVIER, ISIDORA P. JAVIER, BENJAMIN P. JAVIER, and LEONOR CRISOLOGO, respondents.
FACTS
The case involves a petition to review a decision of the Court of Appeals. The respondents (Javier et al.) are owners of a building on their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot owned by the petitioner (Cid). Both lots are covered by Torrens titles (Original Certificates of Title Nos. 7225 and 7545, issued in 1937). The respondents claimed to have acquired, by prescription, a negative easement of light and view over the petitioner’s lot. This claim was based on an alleged verbal prohibition made to the petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest around 1913 or 1914, forbidding the obstruction of the windows. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals upheld the existence of this easement. The petitioner sought review, arguing the courts erred. A preliminary injunction had been issued against the petitioner’s construction, also based on an alleged violation of a municipal ordinance requiring a 2-meter distance between the eaves of adjoining buildings.
ISSUE
1. Whether the respondents acquired by prescription an enforceable negative easement of light and view through a mere verbal prohibition, under Article 538 of the Spanish Civil Code (the applicable law at the time of the alleged 1913/1914 act).
2. Whether any such easement was extinguished by the registration of the servient estate under the Torrens System without annotation on the certificate of title.
3. Whether the preliminary injunction (also based on a municipal ordinance violation) should be maintained.
RULING
1. On the Acquisition of the Easement: The Supreme Court REVERSED the Court of Appeals. The Court held that under Article 538 of the Spanish Civil Code, the acquisition of a negative easement by prescription requires the prohibition to be made through a “formal act.” Interpreting this phrase, the Court ruled it requires not merely any oral or written act, but one executed with due form or solemnity, implying a formal writing. The Court noted this interpretation is supported by the clarifying language of Article 621 of the new Civil Code, which explicitly requires the prohibition to be in “an instrument acknowledged before a notary public.” Therefore, the alleged verbal prohibition in 1913/1914 was insufficient to acquire the easement by prescription.
2. On the Effect of Torrens Registration: The Court further held that even assuming arguendo an easement was acquired, it was extinguished by the operation of the Torrens System. Both lots were registered in 1937 under decrees issued in a cadastral case. By that date, the 20-year prescriptive period (from 1913/1914) would have allegedly run. However, the corresponding certificates of title contained no annotation of any easement. Pursuant to Section 39 of the Land Registration Act (in relation to the Cadastral Law), such an unregistered encumbrance is cut off by the registration of the servient estate.
3. On the Injunction and Ordinance Violation: In its Resolution of January 20, 1961, the Court denied the respondents’ motion for reconsideration and held there was no reason to continue the injunction. The Court found that the alleged violation of the municipal ordinance (overlapping eaves) was not solely attributable to the petitioner. The respondents had reconstructed their house in 1946, placing their wall only 50 cm from the boundary. If they had built at least 1 meter from the boundary (as the petitioner did), the violation would not have occurred. Therefore, compliance with the ordinance would require adjustments by both parties, not just the petitioner.
DISPOSITIVE:
The decision of the Court of Appeals was reversed. The preliminary injunction was dissolved. The case was remanded to the court of origin for adjudication of damages, if any, caused by the injunction. No costs were awarded. The motion for reconsideration was denied.