G.R. No. L-140; December 17, 1945
SOCORRO R. TIANGCO, petitioner, vs. AGUSTIN LIBORO and JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH II, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Socorro R. Tiangco filed a motion to suspend the execution of a final judgment in an ejectment suit (desahucio) commenced by respondent Agustin Liboro. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch II, denied the motion in its order dated November 16, 1945, finding that the major portion of the building was occupied by a store and not solely used for residence, and that the petitioner had sublet the premises without the lessor’s consent. Tiangco sought certiorari to annul the order, contending that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion because (1) the premises were solely for residential purposes and she had not subleased them, and (2) the judge failed to comply with Commonwealth Act No. 689 by not hearing the parties before denying the petition for suspension.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to suspend execution of the final ejectment judgment under Commonwealth Act No. 689 .

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The Court held:
1. The issues of whether the building was destined solely for dwelling and whether the petitioner sublet the premises were already res adjudicata, having been conclusively determined in the final decision of the ejectment suit rendered on June 29, 1945. That decision expressly found that the major portion of the premises was occupied by a store (belonging to a certain Mr. Pua, with whom petitioner claimed partnership), constituting a violation of the lease contract and indicating the building was not used solely for residence.
2. The requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 689 for suspension of execution is that the building be destined solely for dwelling—referring to the actual use by the lessee, not the future intended use by the proprietor. The trial court’s finding that the building was not solely used for dwelling precluded suspension.
3. The petitioner’s claim of lack of hearing was unfounded, as the motion for suspension was actually heard and argued on November 3, 1945, and the parties submitted memoranda. No further trial was necessary on the already adjudicated facts.
4. Equity considerations also weighed against the petitioner: she had nearly six months since the June 1945 judgment to find another dwelling, while the respondent proprietor lost his residence in February 1945 and was in dire need of the premises.
The respondent judge acted in conformity with law, and the petition was denied with costs.