G.R. No. L-13711; May 25, 1960
GREGORIO SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. JUSTINIANA DE TORRES, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

The original action was for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage filed by respondents against petitioner Gregorio Salazar. On September 8, 1956, the parties filed a joint motion for judgment based on a compromise agreement, which the trial court approved on October 30, 1956. The agreement required Salazar to pay P2,896.50 in installments, with the stipulation that failure to pay would entitle respondents to immediate execution and foreclosure, and that the judgment would be final, executory, and not subject to appeal. Salazar paid only P1,030.00, leaving a balance of P1,866.50. Consequently, respondents obtained a writ of execution, leading to a public auction sale on February 25, 1957, where the mortgaged property was sold to three of the four respondents for P2,034.00 to cover the judgment balance and sheriff’s fees. The trial court denied confirmation of this first sale due to petitioner’s objection regarding the non-participation of the fourth respondent, Bonifacia de Torres, and ordered a new sale.
A second auction sale was held on September 24, 1957. Petitioner submitted a written bid of P2,069.00 to cover the judgment credit and costs of the second sale. Respondents bid P2,257.34, which the sheriff accepted as the highest bid, issuing a deed of sale without requiring respondents to pay down the amount because they were judgment creditors. Petitioner filed motions to declare himself the highest bidder and to annul the sale, arguing that respondents’ bid was void for non-payment, that Bonifacia de Torres’s participation was unauthorized, and that his bid fully satisfied the obligation. The trial court, in an order dated November 21, 1957, upheld Bonifacia de Torres’s right to participate and clarified that judgment creditors need not pay down their bid unless it exceeded the judgment amount. It found petitioner’s bid sufficient and alternatively gave him two days to pay P2,069.00 to the sheriff, failing which respondents could pay P167.50 (the excess over the judgment) to secure confirmation.
Instead of complying, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal. Respondents paid the P167.50, and on December 3, 1957, the trial court confirmed the sheriff’s sale. On February 3, 1958, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s appeal, ruling that the November 21, 1957 order was interlocutory (not final) because it did not dispose of the case, as confirmation of the sale was still pending. The court also noted that petitioner’s failure to appeal the December 3, 1957 confirmation order rendered that order final, making his appeal moot.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court’s order of November 21, 1957 was a final and appealable order, and whether mandamus lies to compel approval of petitioner’s record on appeal and to give due course to his appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition for mandamus and affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the appeal. The Court held that the November 21, 1957 order was interlocutory, not final, because it neither set aside nor confirmed the foreclosure sale but merely held confirmation in abeyance to allow petitioner or respondents to make payments. A foreclosure sale is not complete until confirmed by the court; until confirmation, the court retains control over the proceedings. The final act consummating the sale is the order of confirmation, from which an appeal may be taken. Since petitioner did not appeal the December 3, 1957 confirmation order, it became final, rendering his appeal from the earlier interlocutory order moot. An appeal from an interlocutory decree is lost when a final decree becomes immune to attack due to the lapse of the appeal period. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed the appeal, and mandamus cannot be granted to compel approval of the record on appeal.