GR L 13661; (November, 1959) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-13661; November 28, 1959
KO WAI ME, petitioner, vs. EMILIO L. GALANG, FRANCISCO DE LA ROSA and FELIX S. TALABIS, Commissioners of Immigration, respondents.
FACTS
On June 28, 1956, Chua Tao, the alleged husband of petitioner Ko Wai Me, applied for a temporary visitor’s visa for her. The Bureau of Immigration, through Commissioner Emilio L. Galang, recommended denial, citing a September 29, 1954 decision of the Board of Commissioners finding Ko Wai Me guilty of violating the Immigration Act for surreptitiously entering the Philippines without inspection on January 9, 1953. Despite this, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs authorized the visa issuance subject to certain conditions. Ko Wai Me arrived on September 28, 1956. The Board of Special Inquiry, in a report dated October 4, 1956, noted the prior deportation order but recommended her admission as a temporary visitor for three months, concluding that since she had voluntarily left the country at her own expense and had not been physically deported, she could be admitted. The First Deputy Commissioner, Francisco de la Rosa, opined that she qualified under the Cabinet policy but, noting she was a previous deportee whose admission was discretionary under Section 29(b)(2) of the Immigration Act, referred the case to Commissioner Galang. On October 18, 1956, Commissioner Galang decided to exclude her. Accordingly, on October 19, 1956, the First Deputy Commissioner issued an exclusion order, citing the Commissioner’s discretionary power under Section 29(b)(2). The Court of First Instance of Manila granted Ko Wai Me’s petition, ruling the exclusion order had no support and the Board of Special Inquiry’s favorable decision was final. The Immigration Commissioners appealed.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of First Instance erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus and ordering the admission of Ko Wai Me, thereby nullifying the exclusion order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration.
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. The Court held that the exclusion order was legally valid. The Board of Special Inquiry’s conclusion that Ko Wai Me’s voluntary departure at her own expense erased her status as a deportee or excluded alien was erroneous. The final 1954 deportation order against her for surreptitious entry remained conclusive evidence that she was a person who had been “excluded or deported” within the meaning of Section 29(a)(15) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. As such, her admission could only be permitted upon the exercise of discretion by the Commissioner of Immigration under Section 29(b)(2). Commissioner Galang’s decision to exclude her was a valid exercise of that discretion. Therefore, the lower court’s decision had no legal or factual basis and was set aside.
