GR L 13523; (May, 1960) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-13523; May 31, 1960
ANICETO MADRID, petitioner, vs. THE AUDITOR GENERAL and/or THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Aniceto Madrid was a permanent lighthouse keeper before World War II. After liberation, on August 10, 1945, he was reappointed to his pre-war position in an acting capacity. On March 14, 1946, a criminal information for treason was filed against him. On April 30, 1946, the Acting Collector of Customs terminated his services based on a communication from the Office of the Solicitor General citing derogatory information. The treason case was unconditionally dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Albay on March 1, 1951, for failure of the prosecution to secure evidence. On June 20, 1951, Madrid, through counsel, requested reinstatement and payment of back salary from May 1946. He had already been reinstated in the Lighthouse Service of the Philippine Navy. The Auditor General denied his claim for back salary on September 5, 1956, ruling that Madrid’s failure to contest his removal for over five years constituted abandonment or acquiescence. Madrid’s subsequent requests for reconsideration were denied, leading to this petition for review.
ISSUE
Whether petitioner Aniceto Madrid is entitled to back salary for the period of his alleged illegal separation from government service.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Auditor General denying the claim for back salary. The Court held that a person claiming a right to a position in the civil service must institute the proper proceedings to assert that right within one year from the date of separation; otherwise, he is deemed to have abandoned the office or acquiesced to the removal. Petitioner, who was removed on April 30, 1946, took no action to contest the legality of his removal for over five years until June 20, 1951. By such failure, he is now barred from questioning the separation and is not entitled to salary during the lay-off period. Additionally, the Court noted that petitioner’s appointment prior to removal was in an acting (temporary) capacity, which could be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power.