G.R. No. L-13459; April 29, 1960
DEOMEDES S. ROJAS, in his capacity as legal administrator of the estate of the deceased MARIA SIPRIASO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA PAPA, as principal, CONSUELO PAPA VILLANUEVA, as attorney-in-fact and MARIANO B. VILLANUEVA, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

Deomedes S. Rojas, as legal administrator of the estate of Maria Sipriaso, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cavite to collect the unpaid balance of a promissory note executed by Consuelo Papa Villanueva as attorney-in-fact for Rosa Papa and secured by a mortgage on Rosa Papa’s land. Summons was served on the defendants on January 19, 1956. The defendants were granted two extensions to file their answer: a first extension of fifteen days and a second extension of twenty days “from receipt of a copy of this order.” The court’s order for the second extension was mailed to the defendants on February 26, 1956. The defendants failed to file an answer, and upon plaintiff’s motion, the court declared them in default on April 21, 1956, despite defendants’ opposition and subsequent motions for reconsideration. The court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on September 7, 1956, based on the evidence presented. The defendants appealed, claiming the trial court erred in declaring them in default, in depriving them of due process, and in rendering a decision unsupported by evidence and without considering their defense.

ISSUE

The principal issue is whether the defendants were properly declared in default before the expiration of the period granted to them to file their answer. The resolution of the other assigned errors depends on this determination.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision and order. The defendants were properly declared in default. The second extension of twenty days was to be counted from receipt of the court’s order, which was mailed on February 26, 1956. Applying the rule that service by mail is complete upon expiration of five days after mailing, and with no proof the mail was returned, the defendants were deemed to have received the order at the latest by March 2, 1956. Therefore, their period to answer expired on March 22, 1956. Their failure to file an answer by that date justified the default order. The Court found no excusable negligence, as the defendants did not demonstrate efforts to pay the debt or settle amicably as they claimed was their reason for seeking extension, and they neglected to inquire about the court’s action on their motion by the date they themselves had requested (April 15, 1956). The requisites of due process were satisfied: the court had jurisdiction, and the defendants were given an opportunity to be heard but failed to avail themselves of it through their own lack of diligence. The trial court’s decision, based on the plaintiff’s evidence presented after the default declaration, was proper, and the defendants, being in default, lost their right to present their defense. The appeal was deemed frivolous.