G.R. No. L-13442, December 20, 1919
NARCISA SANCHEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ROQUE RAMOS, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:
Ciriaco Fernandez owned a piece of land. On July 1, 1910, he sold it under a pacto de retro (with right of repurchase) for one year to the spouses Marcelino Gomez and Narcisa Sanchez (the plaintiff-appellant) through a public instrument. The spouses never took material possession of the land. The period for repurchase expired without Fernandez exercising his right. On July 3, 1912, Fernandez sold the same land again, this time via a private document, to Roque Ramos (the defendant-appellee), who immediately took material possession. Neither sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds. Narcisa Sanchez filed an action to recover the land. The trial court, applying Article 1473 of the Civil Code, declared Ramos’s sale preferable due to his prior material possession and absolved him from the complaint. Sanchez appealed.

ISSUE:
Which of the two unrecorded sales of the same real property has a better rightthe first sale evidenced by a public instrument (symbolic delivery) or the second sale followed by actual material possession?

RULING:
The Supreme Court REVERSED the trial court’s decision. It ruled in favor of the first vendee, Narcisa Sanchez.

The Court held that the “possession” referred to in the third paragraph of Article 1473 of the Civil Code (for determining preference between two unrecorded sales) includes not only material possession but also symbolic possession. Symbolic possession is acquired through the execution of a public instrument, which, under Article 1462 of the Civil Code, is equivalent to the delivery of the real property.

Upon the execution of the public instrument of sale in 1910, the sale was consummated, and all rights of ownership were transferred to Sanchez. Fernandez retained nothing and, therefore, could not transmit any title to Ramos in 1912. Ramos’s subsequent material possession was merely that of a detainer. Consequently, Sanchez, having first taken possession (symbolically) through the public instrument, acquired a preferable right under Article 1473.

The Court ordered Ramos to deliver possession of the land to Sanchez.

DISSENTING OPINION:
Justice Street argued that the “possession” in Article 1473 means only actual, material, and physical possession. The purpose of the article is to protect an innocent second purchaser who relies on the vendor’s apparent ownership, evidenced by material possession. Symbolic delivery via a public instrument, which involves no real publicity under the Philippine notarial system, should not be considered the “possession” that grants preference under the article, as this would defeat the article’s protective intent.