G.R. No. L-13267; July 26, 1960
SALVADOR CRESPO, petitioner, vs. MARIA BOLANDOS, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

In 1928, the Pampanga River, flowing east to west, separated the land of Felipe Buencamino, Jr. from the registered lots of the respondents (plaintiffs) in Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. By 1954, when the complaint was filed, the river was still flowing east to west but had shifted approximately 387 meters south of its 1928 bed. Buencamino’s agents, and later the petitioner Salvador Crespo who bought the property, claimed ownership through accretion (Article 366 of the Civil Code) over the portions of the respondents’ lots now north of the new riverbed. The respondents filed an action to recover possession. The trial court ruled for the defendant, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. The appellate court found as a fact that the change in the river’s course did not occur gradually since 1928, as claimed by the petitioner, but took place during the period from 1943 to 1945 due to floods occurring three or four times a year. The old 1928 riverbed remained dry and visible.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner acquired ownership over the disputed portions of the respondents’ land through accretion under Article 366 of the Civil Code, or whether the applicable law is Article 372 governing a change of river course.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner did not acquire the land through accretion. The Court is bound by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that there was no gradual erosion and alluvial deposit since 1928. Instead, the change in the river’s course was not gradual but occurred through a series of shifts during floods from 1943 to 1945. Therefore, Article 366 on accretion does not apply. The applicable provision is Article 372 of the Civil Code, which governs when a navigable or floatable river changes its course naturally. Under this article, whenever the river opened a new bed through the respondents’ private estate, that new bed became public property. However, whenever a subsequent flood caused the river to shift again, the respondents automatically recovered the previously lost bed, and the new bed on their property would accrue to the public domain. This process continued until the river settled in its present location in 1945. Consequently, the disputed portions, which were originally part of the respondents’ registered lots and are still separated from the petitioner’s land by the old 1928 bed, were never lost by the respondents and were not acquired by the petitioner. The petitioner was ordered to surrender the disputed portion and pay damages.