G.R. No. L-13090. November 27, 1959.
CIPRIANO C. ANTONIO (deceased), petitioner; CANDELARIA Y. ANTONIO, petitioner-appellee, vs. CARMEN ROCAMORA, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS

Lot No. 102 of the San Carlos Cadastre was originally decreed in favor of the Tabares siblings. Numeriano and Susana Tabares sold their 2/5 undivided share to spouses Martin Antonio and Eugenia Cayas, who later sold a 180-square-meter portion to Florentina Pastrana. Pastrana’s deed could not be registered initially but she took possession and built a house. Upon her death, her daughter Angela Ducay succeeded her and later sold the 180 sq.m. to appellant Carmen Rocamora in 1948. Rocamora built a bodega and corn mill on the property.
Cipriano C. Antonio (son of the Antonio spouses) acquired his parents’ 2/5 share and, with other co-owners, obtained Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4813 on July 16, 1949. On September 30, 1950, Cipriano filed a petition in the cadastral case for approval of a subdivision plan (Psd-29938) to segregate his 2/5 portion as Lot No. 102-A. Rocamora opposed, asserting ownership and possession of the 180 sq.m. within Lot 102-A. On December 9, 1950, the court dismissed Rocamora’s opposition, approved the subdivision plan, and ordered the issuance of separate titles—Lot 102-A to Cipriano and Lot 102-B to the other co-owners.
Rocamora’s motions for reconsideration were denied. Meanwhile, Cipriano died, and his widow, Candelaria Y. Antonio, as administratrix, filed a petition on March 23, 1957, in the same cadastral case for a writ of possession over the 180 sq.m. Rocamora opposed, arguing (a) the December 9, 1950, order did not adjudicate possession or ownership, (b) the proceedings involved voluntary transactions post-decree, and (c) a pending ordinary civil action (Civil Case No. 4119) she filed involved the same property. On June 14, 1957, the lower court granted the writ of possession, prompting this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court erred in issuing a writ of possession in favor of petitioner-appellee based on the order of December 9, 1950, which approved a subdivision plan and directed the issuance of new certificates of title.

RULING

Yes, the lower court erred. The Supreme Court set aside the order dated June 14, 1957.
The proceeding that led to the December 9, 1950, order was merely a petition for approval of a subdivision plan under Section 112 of Act No. 496 (the Land Registration Act). It was a summary proceeding incidental to the original registration case and did not constitute an adjudication of title or possession between adverse parties. The order only approved the subdivision and directed the cancellation and issuance of titles; it did not resolve ownership or possession. A writ of possession under Section 17 of Act No. 496 is proper only as an execution of a judgment or decree adjudicating title between adversary parties in the registration proceeding. Since the December 9, 1950, order was not such an adjudication, no writ of possession could issue based on it. Furthermore, a writ could not be issued pursuant to the original decree against Rocamora, as she was a successor-in-interest of the original applicant (through Pastrana) and obtained possession long after the original decree became final. The Court declined to rule on the merits of the parties’ claims, noting these were being litigated in the pending ordinary civil action (Civil Case No. 4119).