GR L 13027; (June, 1960) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-13027; June 30, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, VISITACION M. MERIS, offended party-appellant, vs. ASCENCION P. OLARTE, defendant-appellee.
FACTS
Defendant Ascencion P. Olarte was charged with libel for writing and sending allegedly libelous letters to Visitacion M. Meris on or about February 24, 1954, and subsequently thereafter. The offended party, Meris, lodged a charge with the provincial fiscal on January 7, 1956, and subsequently filed a complaint for libel with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, on February 22, 1956. The defendant waived her right to a preliminary investigation, and the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, where an information was filed on July 3, 1956. The defendant moved to quash the information on the ground of prescription of the offense. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case, holding that the crime had prescribed. The complainant, with the conformity of the special counsel of the provincial fiscal’s office, appealed. The defendant also filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, which was ultimately denied after the Solicitor General adopted the appellant’s brief.
ISSUE
Whether the filing of the complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court on February 22, 1956, interrupted the running of the two-year prescriptive period for the crime of libel, or whether only the filing of the information in the Court of First Instance on July 3, 1956, could effect such interruption.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the filing of the complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court on February 22, 1956, effectively interrupted the prescriptive period. The Court rejected the defendant’s contention that only the filing of the information in the Court of First Instance could interrupt prescription, based on a reading of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 1289 ) which specified that actions for written defamation “shall be filed” with the Court of First Instance. The Court held that this provision pertains to the venue and jurisdiction for the trial of the case on its merits, not to the commencement of the criminal action for the purpose of interrupting prescription. A criminal action is commenced by the filing of a complaint or information in any court authorized to receive it and take cognizance of the offense. The Justice of the Peace Court, being authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation for offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance (like libel), was a “proper court” for the commencement of the action. Therefore, the complaint filed on February 22, 1956, which was within two years from the discovery of the last alleged libelous letter (received on or about May 9, 1954), interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. Consequently, the crime had not prescribed when the information was filed in the Court of First Instance on July 3, 1956. The order of dismissal was set aside and the case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings.