G.R. No. L-12998; July 25, 1960
BIENVENIDA JOCSON, in her own behalf and as judicial guardian of the minors ROMEO INTENGAN, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. MANUEL P. SILOS, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

On April 26, 1957, plaintiffs-appellants, the legitimate children and heirs of the late Agueda Torres, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros to annul the sale made by Agustin Jocson (their father and Agueda’s husband) to defendant-appellee Manuel P. Silos of one-half of a parcel of land (Lot No. 555-B, Himamaylan Cadastre). They alleged that Agustin Jocson and Agueda Torres lived together as husband and wife without marriage from 1915, acquired the land in 1931 through Agueda’s thrift, were lawfully married in 1934, and that Agueda died soon after in 1934. In 1935, Agustin Jocson sold the entire parcel to Silos, who allegedly knew Agueda had left children. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the lot was conjugal property, annulment of the sale of the one-half share belonging to Agueda’s estate, cancellation of Silos’s Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2503, issuance of a new title showing Silos as owner of one-half and plaintiffs as owners of the other half, delivery of possession and products, and costs.
On May 25, 1957, Silos filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on grounds of lack of cause of action and that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The court dismissed the complaint on June 21, 1957, specifically on the ground that the action was barred by prescription. Plaintiffs filed multiple motions for reconsideration (on June 26, July 15, and July 25, 1957), all of which were denied. Their subsequent petition for relief under Rule 38, filed on August 14, 1957, was also denied on August 17, 1957, prompting this appeal.
In their petition for relief, plaintiffs relied on an affidavit from their attorney-in-fact, Juliano Excija, alleging excusable mistake and negligence that prevented a timely appeal. The alleged negligence involved: the failure of their original counsel, Atty. Jose M. Presquito (who had been served the motion to dismiss but whose services they claimed were terminated), to object or appear; the failure of their subsequently engaged counsel, Atty. Pitt E. Vasquez, to act because the motion was not served on him; and communication failures between the attorney-in-fact and Atty. Vasquez. They argued that had their third motion for reconsideration been denied earlier (on July 29 instead of August 3, 1957), they could have perfected an appeal within the 30-day period.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in denying the plaintiffs’ petition for relief from the order dismissing their complaint, which dismissal was based on the action being barred by the statute of limitations.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the petition for relief. The Court held that the failure of plaintiffs’ counsel to file an objection to the motion to dismiss or appear at its hearing was not the reason for the dismissal. The complaint was dismissed because the action was barred by prescription, as 22 years had elapsed from the sale in 1935 to the filing of the complaint in 1957. All possible grounds to oppose the motion to dismiss had already been raised and considered in the three denied motions for reconsideration.
The Court also addressed the plaintiffs’ substantive argument that their action to annul the sale was imprescriptible because the land was under the Torrens system. The Court found this argument incorrect under the circumstances. It inferred from the fact that Silos obtained a new transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 2503) in his name upon the sale, and the original TCT in Agustin Jocson’s name was cancelled, that the title to the land was registered in the name of Agustin Jocson alone, not in the names of both Agustin Jocson and Agueda Torres. Therefore, the imprescriptibility of title under the Torrens system did not apply to bar the defense of prescription in this case. The order denying the petition for relief was in accordance with law.