G.R. No. L-12993; October 28, 1918
RAFAEL J. FERRER, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. JOAQUIN J. DE INCHAUSTI, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs Rafael J. Ferrer and Maria Angelina Ferrer, represented by her husband Ricardo Hernandez, filed a complaint seeking to be declared the sole legitimate heirs of their mother, Rosa Matilde Viademonte y Gonzalez. They claimed that Rosa Viademonte was a legitimate daughter of the deceased Isabel Gonzalez from her first marriage to Ramon Martinez Viademonte. They asserted a right to inherit a one-fifth share of the estate of Isabel Gonzalez, equivalent to the share received by her other four acknowledged children: Ramon Viademonte, Rafael C. de Inchausti, Joaquin C. de Inchausti, and Clotilde de Inchausti de Vidal. The defendants, who are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the other children of Isabel Gonzalez, denied that Rosa Viademonte was a legitimate child of Isabel Gonzalez. They also raised the defenses of acquisitive prescription (adverse possession for over thirty years) and the prescription of the plaintiffs’ action under the Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Rosa Matilde Viademonte was a legitimate child of Isabel Gonzalez, entitled to a share in her inheritance.
2. Whether the plaintiffs’ action to claim their alleged hereditary share had already prescribed.

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision and dismissed the complaint.
1. On the Legitimacy and Hereditary Right: The Court found it unnecessary to definitively resolve whether Rosa Viademonte was a daughter of Isabel Gonzalez. Applying the transitory provisions of the Civil Code, the Court held that even assuming Rosa Viademonte was a natural child of Isabel Gonzalez, she could not succeed to the inheritance. Isabel Gonzalez died on December 12, 1886, before the Civil Code took effect in the Philippines. At her death, the right of succession vested immediately in her four legitimate (or legitimated) children. These were acquired rights which, under the old law and the transitory rules of the new Civil Code, could not be impaired by a subsequently enacted code that might recognize new heirs (like natural children). Therefore, the vested rights of the existing legitimate heirs barred any claim by a purported natural child.
2. On Prescription: The Court held that the plaintiffs’ action had prescribed. The action, which was essentially for the recognition of a right to an inheritance and recovery of a corresponding share, was governed by the ten-year prescriptive period under Section 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure ( Act No. 190 ). This period began when the cause of action accruedupon the death of Isabel Gonzalez in 1886 and the distribution of her estate in 1888. The complaint was filed only in 1916, well beyond the ten-year period which started when Act No. 190 took effect in 1901. The Court distinguished this from a simple action for partition among acknowledged co-heirs, noting that the plaintiffs’ primary objective was to first establish their status as heirs, an action subject to prescription.

The Court also strongly rebuked the appellants’ counsel for misrepresenting the trial court’s decision in his brief, attributing a factual finding to the judge that was never made.