G.R. No. L-12940; April 17, 1959
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. FROILAN BAYONA and PEOPLE’S BANK & TRUST COMPANY, respondents.

FACTS

On September 30, 1957, members of the petitioner labor organization, the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU), who were employees of the People’s Bank and Trust Company, declared a strike and set up picket lines. On October 3, 1957, the Bank filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 33913) in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Association of Bank Employees (NATU) and its officers, alleging illegal acts during the picketing that would cause irreparable injury. Based solely on the sworn allegations in the complaint, respondent Judge Froilan Bayona immediately issued a writ of preliminary injunction on the same day, October 3, 1957. The writ restrained the defendants from various acts, including mass, violent, or boisterous picketing, coercing customers, and interfering with the Bank’s business, “until further orders.” On October 5, 1957, NATU filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition, arguing that the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because: (a) the case involved a labor dispute cognizable only by the Court of Industrial Relations, and (b) the issuance violated Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 (The Industrial Peace Act). Respondents countered that the picketing was illegal, the writ was effective for only five days, and the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction under prior Supreme Court rulings.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, declared the writ of preliminary injunction null and void, but denied the writ of prohibition.
1. On Jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance: The Court held that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over the case. Citing PAFLU vs. Tan and PAFLU vs. Barot, the Supreme Court ruled that courts of first instance retain jurisdiction to issue injunctions in labor disputes, provided the dispute does not involve an industry indispensable to the national interest (as certified by the President), a controversy over minimum wage, hours of employment, or an unfair labor practice.
2. On the Validity of the Injunction Issuance: The Court ruled that the respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction and committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ. The issuance violated the mandatory procedure under Section 9(d) of Republic Act No. 875 . The law requires that an ex parte injunction be issued only “upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the court in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice.” This necessitates a hearing where sworn testimony is taken in open court. The Judge issued the writ based solely on the allegations in the verified complaint, without holding any hearing or taking any witness testimony, which rendered the injunction void. The Court cited its prior rulings in Reyes vs. Tan and PAFLU vs. Barot to support this conclusion.
3. On the Argument that the Issue was Moot: The Court rejected the respondents’ argument that the issue became moot because the ex parte order was effective for only five days (expiring on October 8, 1957). The petition was filed on October 5, 1957, before the expiration. Furthermore, the writ issued by the Judge ordered restraint “until further orders,” which contravened the five-day limit for ex parte orders under the law. The Court also noted that it had previously nullified similar orders even after their expiration, as seen in PAFLU vs. Tan.
4. On the Claim for Damages: The Court agreed with the respondents that any claim for damages suffered by the petitioner due to the improper injunction should be determined in the original Civil Case No. 33913 where the writ was issued, and not in the present certiorari proceeding.
DISPOSITIVE:
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on October 3, 1957, was declared null and void. Costs were assessed against the respondent People’s Bank and Trust Company.