G.R. No. L-12836; April 26, 1961
MANILA TRADING & SUPPLY COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE EDUARDO D. ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity Judge of the Court of First Instance of NEGROS OCCIDENTAL and SOCORRO ZAYCO, respondents.

FACTS

This is a petition for mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to approve a record on appeal. The case originated from two testate estate proceedings. The respondent judge approved a plenary project of partition submitted by the administratrix, Socorro Zayco, which excluded petitioner Manila Trading & Supply Company. Petitioner appealed that approval order to the Court of Appeals. Subsequently, while that appeal was pending, the administratrix moved for the approval of a separate “Partial Project of Partition and Declaration of Heirs” that had been filed earlier. Petitioner opposed this partial project, arguing its approval would leave no estate properties against which it could enforce its claim if successful in the pending appeal.
The trial court overruled petitioner’s opposition and approved the partial project on June 10, 1957. On July 8, 1957, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing the court lost jurisdiction to approve any other project of partition once it had approved the plenary project and an appeal therefrom was perfected. The court denied this motion on July 13, 1957. Petitioner then filed its record on appeal, bond, and notice of appeal on July 30, 1957. The respondent judge disapproved the record on appeal, primarily ruling that the July 8 motion for reconsideration was pro forma and thus did not suspend the period to appeal, making the July 30 filing late.

ISSUE

Whether the motion for reconsideration filed on July 8, 1957, was pro forma, thereby failing to suspend the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that the motion for reconsideration was not pro forma. The respondent judge erred in applying precedents concerning second motions for reconsideration to the petitioner’s first and only motion. The legal logic is clear: the rule declaring a second motion for reconsideration as pro forma (under the then Rule 37, Section 4) is explicitly inapplicable to a first motion. The Court held that the cited jurisprudence was misplaced because it dealt with successive motions, not an initial plea for reconsideration.
Furthermore, the Court found that even if the motion were to be scrutinized under the standard for a second motion, it still could not be considered pro forma. A pro forma motion is one that does not raise new substantial grounds but merely rehashes old arguments. Here, the July 8 motion introduced a new and distinct jurisdictional argument: that the trial court lost authority to act on the partial partition once it had approved the plenary project and that order was on appeal. This was a fresh legal point not merely a repetition of prior oppositions. Consequently, the motion was valid and suspended the running of the appeal period, making the record on appeal timely filed. The Court set aside the order of disapproval and directed the trial court to approve and forward the record on appeal.