G.R. No. L-12828; April 13, 1959
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FILOMENA C. FOSTER, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The accused, Filomena C. Foster, is the owner of the Pioneer Institute of Arts and Fashions, operated in Manila. She was granted a temporary permit by the Secretary of Public Instruction on September 9, 1947, to operate her vocational school, valid for one year until September 8, 1948. On April 27, 1949, she applied for a renewal of this permit. The evidence is unclear whether this application was approved, though a government witness testified it was disapproved and notice was sent, but the accused denied receiving any such notice. Consequently, she continued to advertise her school as government-authorized and enrolled students, including Pacencia Sorongon on May 10, 1954, who paid a tuition fee. The accused was previously charged with the same offense but was acquitted on the ground that her original permit had not been shown to be cancelled. She was subsequently charged again for acts committed from 1952 to November 18, 1954. The Court of First Instance of Manila found her guilty of violating Section 5, in relation to Section 12, of Act No. 2706, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 180 , and sentenced her to pay a fine. She appealed, raising purely legal issues.

ISSUE

1. Whether fashion and beauty schools fall under the regulatory provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 180 .
2. Whether the defense of double jeopardy is valid in this case.

RULING

1. Yes, fashion and beauty schools are covered by Commonwealth Act No. 180 . The law defines “private school or college” to include any private institution offering vocational courses that grant diplomas or certificates and are not under the authority of specific government bureaus. A vocational school, in a broader sense, provides training for useful employment. The accused’s institute, offering courses in fashion and beauty, is vocational in character. This was recognized by the accused herself when she initially applied for and received a permit explicitly for “Special vocational courses in accordance with the provision of Com. Act 180.” The Department of Public Instruction has also prescribed minimum requirements for such schools concerning equipment, faculty, and methods. The temporary permit issued expired by its own terms on September 8, 1948. Its expiration was automatic, requiring renewal for continued lawful operation. By continuing to operate and advertise the school after the permit’s expiration without securing a certificate of recognition, the accused violated the law.
2. No, the defense of double jeopardy is not valid. The accused’s prior acquittal (Criminal Case No. 14936) was for acts committed from 1948 to 1952. The present prosecution is for subsequent acts committed from 1952 to November 18, 1954. These are distinct offenses not included in the former charge. An acquittal for past violations does not constitute a certificate of authority or immunity for future operations under Commonwealth Act No. 180 . To rule otherwise would create an anomalous situation where the accused could operate indefinitely without authority based on a prior acquittal.
The decision of the lower court is affirmed.