G.R. No. L-1266; August 29, 1947
CO CHIONG and LIM CHIU GUAN, petitioners, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Co Chiong and Lim Chiu Guan filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court on January 7, 1947. They sought to annul an order issued by respondent Judge Rafael Dinglasan that dissolved a writ of preliminary injunction. That injunction, originally issued by the same judge in Civil Case No. 1436 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, had enjoined other respondents (including Miguel Cuaderno, the Secretary of Finance) from ejecting the petitioners from their market stalls. The petitioners also asked the Supreme Court to issue an ex parte preliminary injunction to prevent their ejectation pending the proceedings. The Supreme Court denied the ex parte injunction but required respondents to answer. After the answer was filed and memoranda submitted, the case was deemed submitted for decision on February 10, 1947. Subsequently, the Secretary of Finance suspended the operation of Department of Finance Order No. 32, which was the basis for the threatened ejectment, and the respondents refrained from ejecting the petitioners despite the dissolved injunction. Furthermore, on April 19, 1947, the respondent judge in the lower court rendered a final judgment granting the injunction (styled as a writ of prohibition) in the main case (Civil Case No. 1436). The petitioners then filed a manifestation with the Supreme Court, noting that the principal action was, in substance, an ordinary action for injunction aimed at restraining the enforcement of Republic Act No. 37 and Department of Finance Order No. 32 on constitutional grounds, and that the lower court’s judgment had already been rendered.

ISSUE

Whether the Supreme Court should grant the petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul the respondent judge’s order dissolving the preliminary injunction and to compel its reissuance, given the subsequent developments in the case.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Court held that the question presented had become moot. The principal action in the lower court was an ordinary action for injunction, not a special civil action of prohibition, as the respondents were not exercising judicial or ministerial functions. The necessity for the Supreme Court to decide on the propriety of the dissolved preliminary injunction was eliminated by two subsequent events: (1) the Secretary of Finance had already suspended the enforcement of Department Order No. 32, and (2) more decisively, the respondent judge had rendered a final judgment on April 19, 1947, granting the injunction (prohibition) in the main case. Pursuant to Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, such a judgment in an injunction action is effective and not stayed by an appeal unless the trial court orders otherwise. Since the lower court did not order a stay, its judgment was operative. Therefore, there was no longer any need for the Supreme Court to order the reissuance of the preliminary injunction. The Court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 37 and Department Order No. 32 at that time, as it was unnecessary for the disposition of the instant petition and that question could be addressed when the appeal on the merits of the main case was decided. The petition was dismissed without costs.