G.R. No. L-12534; May 23, 1959
Angeles Rodriguez, Jose Rodriguez, Maria Rodriguez, Caridad Rodriguez, Corazon Rodriguez, Jesus Rodriguez, Jr., Carmelita Rodriguez (represented by Guardian ad Litem Eusebia de Leon), petitioners-appellants, vs. Court of Appeals, The Hon. Judge Emilio Rilloraza of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, Alfredo Ferrer, Trinidad Ferrer, and Provincial Sheriff, respondents-appellees.

FACTS

The petitioners-appellants (defendants in the lower court) seek to review a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s order for immediate execution of its earlier order. The trial court, in Civil Case No. 313, had ordered the petitioners to pay the respondents (plaintiffs) the sum of P2,238.50 as their share in the income from a disputed parcel of land. The Court of Appeals found that the main action had been pending since 1947, and a final judgment had already declared the respondents as co-owners of the land, entitling them to a share of its income. The petitioners had consistently denied the respondents this right. The respondents filed a motion for immediate execution, which the trial court granted on October 18, 1956. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and offered to file a supersedeas bond to stay execution, but this was denied. The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. The petitioners now assign three errors, the third being that the courts failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 39, Section 2 of the Rules of Court regarding execution pending appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed a serious abuse of discretion by ordering immediate execution pending appeal without complying with the requirements of Rule 39, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that such execution be based on “good reasons” stated in a special order.

RULING

No, the courts did not commit an abuse of discretion. The order for immediate execution was valid. While the trial court’s order granting execution did not itself enumerate the “good reasons,” it made reference to the motion for execution, which alleged sufficient justifications. Furthermore, these good reasons are distinctly found in the record and were established as facts by the Court of Appeals, namely: (1) the case had been dragging on since 1947; (2) the respondents’ co-ownership and right to share in the income had already been established by final judgment; (3) the petitioners had consistently denied the respondents their share; (4) the petitioners took their time to perfect their appeal; and (5) the respondents offered and filed a bond to answer for any damages from the execution. Jurisprudence holds that statement by reference in the order is sufficient, and that the dilatory nature of an appeal and the filing of a bond by the prevailing party constitute good and special reasons for execution pending appeal. Additionally, the approval of a supersedeas bond to stay execution lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, which may disregard it and order immediate execution if special and compelling reasons exist. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.