G.R. No. L-12429; July 21, 1961
ERMIDIA A. MARIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE ROYAL INTEROCEAN LINES and J. V. KAMERLING, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

The case originated from the dismissal of Ermidia Mariano from her employment with Royal Interocean Lines on October 23, 1953. She subsequently filed a suit claiming various benefits. The Supreme Court rendered a judgment on February 27, 1961, which is now subject to this motion for reconsideration by the appellee, Mariano. A critical factual backdrop is the state of applicable law at the time of her dismissal. The old Code of Commerce, which allowed dismissal without cause upon notice or payment of a mesada for indefinite-term employment, had been repealed by the new Civil Code effective August 30, 1950. The right of an employer to dismiss on such terms was only revived later by Republic Act No. 1052 , enacted on June 12, 1954.
In her motion for reconsideration, Mariano contends that the company’s “Local Staff Allowances” regulations, which were made known to her, formed part of her employment contract. She argues these provisions entitled her to certain benefits, implying her employment was for a fixed period or that she had vested rights. However, the trial court had made a specific finding against her regarding a claim for retirement and age allowance, ruling she did not meet the condition of completing ten successive years of permanent service.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the appellee’s motion for reconsideration, which seeks to revisit the Court’s prior judgment and raise arguments based on the company regulations, should be granted.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration. The legal logic proceeds on two clear grounds. First, on the substantive law applicable at the time of dismissal, the Court reaffirmed that on October 23, 1953, the governing law was the new Civil Code, which had repealed the old mesada provision of the Code of Commerce. Since Republic Act No. 1052 was not yet in effect, Mariano, as an employee engaged for an indefinite period, could be dismissed even without cause and was not entitled to the 30-day notice or one-month salary payment previously required. This legal landscape was settled and dispositive of her core dismissal claim.
Second, the Court addressed her new contractual argument based on the company regulations. It held that even if it were inclined to consider the view that these regulations created a fixed-term employment or vested benefits, it was precluded from doing so by the principle of res judicata. The trial court had already rendered a final and conclusive judgment against Mariano on her specific claim for retirement and age allowance, finding she failed to complete the required ten-year service. Her attempt to appeal that particular part of the judgment failed because her record on appeal was filed out of time, and subsequent mandamus petitions to compel its allowance were dismissed. That portion of the trial court’s decision thus became final and binding between the parties. She could not resurrect or relitigate that issue in this motion. Therefore, having no merit on both the applicable law and the barred contractual claim, the motion for reconsideration was denied.