G.R. No. L-12347; May 30, 1961
HERCULANO GRAPILON, petitioner-appellee, vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF CARIGARA, LEYTE, ET AL., respondents-appellants.

FACTS

In the 1955 elections, Jose Aguilar and Herculano Grapilon were elected Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Carigara, Leyte, respectively. On March 6, 1957, Mayor Aguilar left for Manila on official business pursuant to a municipal council resolution. He did not designate an acting mayor. Upon learning of the mayor’s departure, Vice-Mayor Grapilon immediately informed the municipal secretary, chief of police, and provincial governor that he was assuming the office of acting mayor under Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code. The local officials, following guidance from the provincial governor who opined that no acting mayor should be designated when the absence is for official purpose, refused to recognize Grapilon’s authority.
Grapilon filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of First Instance to compel the municipal council, secretary, and chief of police to recognize him as acting mayor, grant him access to the mayor’s office, and perform their duties accordingly. He also sought moral damages and attorney’s fees. The trial court granted the writ of mandamus, ruling that the vice-mayor was entitled to assume the office during the mayor’s absence. The municipal officials appealed, arguing that mandamus was improper and that Grapilon had no right to assume the office under the circumstances.

ISSUE

Whether Vice-Mayor Herculano Grapilon had the legal right to assume the office of acting municipal mayor during the incumbent mayor’s temporary absence for official business, thereby entitling him to a writ of mandamus.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of the writ of mandamus. The legal logic centers on the proper interpretation of “absence” under Section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code, which states that the vice-mayor shall perform the duties of the mayor “in the event of the latter’s absence, suspension, or other temporary disability.” The Court applied the principle of ejusdem generis, interpreting “absence” in conjunction with “suspension” and “other temporary disability.” These terms collectively denote a condition that effectively prevents the mayor from performing official duties.
The Court held that Mayor Aguilar’s trip to Manila on official business did not constitute such a disabling “absence.” He was not prevented from performing his duties; he was actively executing them in another location on behalf of the municipality. To allow the vice-mayor to act simultaneously would create the anomalous situation of two individuals exercising the powers of mayor for the same municipality. The Court found persuasive a 1948 opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, which defined “effective absence” as one that renders the mayor unable to discharge his functions, not mere physical absence from the territorial jurisdiction. Since Mayor Aguilar was performing official functions, his absence was not “effective,” and Grapilon had no statutory right to assume the office. Consequently, mandamus, which compels the performance of a clear legal duty, did not lie. However, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the appellants’ counterclaim for damages, finding no evidence of malice or bad faith on Grapilon’s part in filing the suit.