G.R. No. L-12313 & L-12314; July 31, 1959
Pedro Jacinto, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Narciso Jacinto, et al., defendants-appellees. (L-12313)

Narciso Jacinto, et al., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. Pedro Jacinto, defendant-appellant. (L-12314)

FACTS

On January 27, 1930, brothers Pedro Jacinto and Narciso Jacinto, sons of Crispin Jacinto, executed a sworn declaration (Exhibit A). It stated that Pedro was the applicant for Homestead Application No. 102221 in Looc, Zamboanga. The declaration acknowledged that Pedro, Narciso, and their father Crispin had all worked on and improved the land, with Crispin using his own money. It stipulated that upon Pedro obtaining the Homestead Patent and Torrens title, and after five years from its issuance, one-half of the land would go to Crispin Jacinto, and the other half would be divided equally between Pedro and Narciso. It also included conditions about continued cultivation and a right of first refusal.
On August 30, 1939, after the homestead application was approved and the patent registered, Original Certificate of Title No. 652 was issued in the name of Pedro Jacinto alone.
On April 24, 1950, over ten years after the title issuance, Crispin and Narciso Jacinto filed an action for specific performance (Civil Case No. 209) against Pedro in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, seeking to enforce the 1930 agreement. They alleged Pedro had refused to share the land’s produce since 1949 and prayed for a receiver.
On December 6, 1950, Pedro Jacinto filed a separate complaint for usurpation and illegal detention (Civil Case No. 297) in the Municipal Court against Crispin, Narciso, and others, alleging they forcibly entered the land and harvested its fruits. This complaint was dismissed by the Municipal Judge, and upon appeal to the Court of First Instance, the cases were consolidated.
Pedro Jacinto died during the pendency of the cases, and his heirs were substituted. After a joint trial, the lower court ruled in favor of Crispin and Narciso Jacinto. It ordered the execution of a deed of partition in accordance with Exhibit A (one-half to Crispin, the other half divided equally between Narciso and Pedro’s heirs) and dismissed Pedro’s complaint for usurpation. Pedro’s heirs appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the action for specific performance to enforce the written agreement (Exhibit A) had already prescribed.
2. Whether the agreement to convey portions of the homestead land after the issuance of the title is legal and enforceable under the Public Land Law.
3. Whether the factual findings of the lower court, regarding the parties’ agreement and possession, are supported by the evidence.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto.
1. On Prescription: The action had not prescribed. Appellant argued that the 10-year prescriptive period for actions on a written contract began to run from the issuance of the title on August 30, 1939. The Court held this was erroneous. By the clear terms of Exhibit A, the cause of action for partition would accrue only “after five years, counted from the issuance of said Homestead Patent and certificate of title,” or from August 30, 1944. Counting from that date, the complaint filed on April 24, 1950 was within the 10-year prescriptive period.
2. On Legality of the Agreement: The agreement is legal and enforceable. Appellant contended that Section 21 of Act No. 2874 (now Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 ) prohibits the transfer of homestead rights after final proof. The Court ruled this provision was inapplicable. The subject of the agreement was not the “homestead right” prior to patent, but the property itself after it had been acquired and title issued in Pedro’s name. An undertaking to divide and convey portions of the land to those who jointly occupied, cleared, and cultivated it does not violate the Public Land Law.
3. On Factual Findings: The trial court’s findings were supported by the evidence. The sworn declaration (Exhibit A) itself, the authenticity of which was admitted, constituted clear evidence that Crispin and Narciso worked on the land. Appellant’s claim of a separate agreement for shares in other lands in exchange for forgoing his share in the Looc property was based solely on his uncorroborated testimony, denied by the other parties. Furthermore, a stipulation of facts established that both parties had lived on the land continuously since 1924, contradicting appellant’s claim of exclusive peaceful possession and forcible usurpation by the appellees.
DISPOSITIVE:
The decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto, with costs against the appellant.