G.R. No. L-12294; January 23, 1958
UNITED PEPSI-COLA SALES ORGANIZATION (PAFLU), petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO CAÑIZARES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS

On April 25, 1957, respondent Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc. filed a complaint for injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila against petitioner United Pepsi-Cola Sales Organization (UPSO), PAFLU, and its president. The complaint alleged that on April 16, 1957, about 100 union-member employees declared a strike and formed picket lines that completely blocked the entrance to the company’s premises. It further alleged that acts of violence, intimidation, and other unlawful acts were committed during the picketing; that the Quezon City Police failed to provide requested protection; that reasonable efforts to settle the labor dispute had been made with the Department of Labor’s Conciliation Service; and that without an ex parte temporary restraining order, substantial and irreparable injury to the company’s property would be unavoidable. On the same day, the lower court received testimony under oath from the company’s witnesses and, upon the filing of a P1,000 bond, issued a writ of preliminary injunction ex parte. The injunction ordered the defendants to, among other things, refrain from obstructing non-striking employees and the public from entering or leaving the company premises and from preventing employees from carrying on their work. Without first moving for the dissolution of the injunction in the lower court, the petitioner union filed this certiorari petition with the Supreme Court two days after the writ’s issuance.

ISSUE

1. Whether the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the injunction case and issue the preliminary injunction despite the pendency of an unfair labor practice case between the same parties in the Court of Industrial Relations.
2. Whether the writ of preliminary injunction was issued in accordance with the procedure outlined by Republic Act No. 875 (The Industrial Peace Act).

RULING

The Supreme Court DENIED the petition for certiorari but DECLARED the challenged writ of preliminary injunction no longer operative.
1. On the jurisdictional issue: The petition was dismissed. The Supreme Court held that certiorari would not lie because the petitioner failed to first bring before the trial court the issue of jurisdiction and the facts upon which such issue could be resolved—specifically, the supposed interrelation between the acts described in the injunction complaint and the pending unfair labor practice case. This connection was not apparent on the face of the record. By not doing so, the petitioner deprived the trial court of the opportunity to determine for itself whether it had jurisdiction. The settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the relief sought is obtainable in the court of origin and that court’s attention has not been called to its supposed error. The criterion for the Court of Industrial Relations’ jurisdiction is whether the acts complained of in the injunction arose out of, or were connected with, the unfair labor practice case—a question of fact that must be presented to the trial court.
2. On the procedural issue under Republic Act No. 875 : The Supreme Court found that the lower court complied with the procedure in Section 9(d) of R.A. 875, which requires that an ex parte injunction be issued only “upon testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify the court in issuing a temporary injunction upon hearing after notice.” The verified complaint contained sufficient allegations, and the court’s order stated it was “supported by testimony of witnesses given under oath.”
3. On the effect of the ex parte injunction: The Court noted that, under Section 9(d) of R.A. 875, a temporary restraining order issued ex parte “shall be effective for no longer than five days and shall be void at the expiration of said five days.” Therefore, the injunction issued on April 25, 1957, became void and of no effect by operation of law after five days, even without a judicial pronouncement.