G.R. No. L-122; May 11, 1946
LU CHU SING and LU TIAN CHIONG, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. LU TIONG GUI (alias LU TIONG KEE), defendant-appellee.

FACTS

The plaintiffs, Lu Chu Sing and his son Lu Tian Chiong, filed a complaint against the defendant, Lu Tiong Gui. The material allegations were: In April 1945, Lu Tian Chiong entered the defendant’s service as a cook. On May 29, 1945, the defendant’s home was robbed. The defendant imputed complicity in the robbery to Lu Tian Chiong and filed a corresponding criminal complaint against him with the City Fiscal’s Office. As a result, Lu Tian Chiong was arrested, detained for five days, and released after posting a P2,000 cash bond. The City Fiscal later dropped the charge for lack of evidence. The plaintiffs alleged that this imputation damaged Lu Tian Chiong’s integrity and honesty, causing him to be rejected for employment in Chinese establishments in Manila, as he was considered an undesirable person. They further alleged that it also ruined the good reputation and credit of the father, Lu Chu Sing, a pre-war businessman of good repute. The plaintiffs claimed the defendant acted maliciously, knowing Lu Tian Chiong was innocent, for the purpose of soiling their good names. They sought damages of P20,000 for the father, P1,000 for attorney’s fees, and a declaration that the criminal charge was malicious. The Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint upon the defendant’s motion, on the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute a cause of action. The defendant contended the action was for defamation/libel, and no civil action for defamation lies since the repeal of Act No. 277 by the Revised Penal Code, and alternatively, that the communication to the Fiscal was privileged. The plaintiffs maintained their action was for malicious prosecution.

ISSUE

1. What is the nature of the obligation (and the underlying alleged felony) the plaintiffs seek to enforce against the defendant based on the complaint’s allegations?
2. May the plaintiffs recover damages upon the facts alleged in the complaint?

RULING

1. The obligation sought to be enforced is ex delicto (arising from an unlawful act), and the alleged felony is libel or defamation, not malicious prosecution. Civil obligations arising from crimes are governed by the Revised Penal Code. The plaintiffs’ theory of malicious prosecution or false accusation is untenable. The crime of false accusation under the old Penal Code was abrogated and not reenacted in the Revised Penal Code. Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes acts directly incriminating an innocent person, applies to acts like planting evidence, not to false accusations in judicial or administrative proceedings. Under the Revised Penal Code, one who falsely accuses another may be held liable for libel or perjury, depending on the manner of commission. The facts alleged—a malicious imputation of a crime (robbery) filed with the City Fiscal’s Office tending to cause dishonor or discredit—fall within the purview of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defining libel (difamacion).
2. The complaint was improperly dismissed, but only plaintiff Lu Tian Chiong has a potential cause of action for damages arising from libel or slander. The repeal of the old Libel Law ( Act No. 277 ) did not abolish the civil action for libel. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, which includes reparation and indemnification. Article 355 specifically provides for a civil action in addition to the criminal penalty for libel. However, the complaint is defective. Plaintiff Lu Chu Sing (the father) has no cause of action because the alleged libel was directed at his son, Lu Tian Chiong; injury to the father’s reputation is merely a consequential damage, and a separate civil action by him is not authorized. Only Lu Tian Chiong, as the directly offended party, can maintain the action. Furthermore, the complaint fails to allege whether the imputation was written (libel) or oral (slander), which is material. The defendant’s claim of privileged communication is a matter of defense (it negates presumption of malice but does not make the communication non-actionable) and is not a proper ground for dismissal. The lower court should have allowed Lu Tian Chiong to amend his complaint to specify whether the charge was written or oral and to allege a specific amount of damages for injury to his reputation.
DISPOSITIVE:
The order of dismissal is reversed. The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion, without costs in this instance.