G.R. No. L-12164; May 22, 1959
BENITO LIWANAG and MARIA LIWANAG REYES, petitioners-appellants, vs. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

FACTS

Petitioners-appellants Benito Liwanag and Maria Liwanag Reyes are co-owners of Liwanag Auto Supply. Their employee, a commercial guard, was killed in the line of duty. The guard’s widow and minor children filed a claim for compensation with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, which granted an award ordering the appellants “to pay jointly and severally” the amount of P3,494.40 to the claimants. In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellants do not contest the right to compensation nor the amount awarded. They solely argue that the Workmen’s Compensation Act does not provide for solidary (joint and several) liability among employers, and therefore, in the absence of an express provision, their obligation should be merely joint, not solidary.

ISSUE

Whether the liability of co-owner employers under the Workmen’s Compensation Act for the death of an employee is solidary (joint and several) or merely joint.

RULING

The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the award, holding the liability of the co-owner employers to be solidary.
The Court reasoned that while the Workmen’s Compensation Act itself contains no express provision declaring the obligation of business partners or co-owners to be solidary, such solidary liability can be gathered from other laws and the purpose of the Act. Articles 1711 and 1712 of the New Civil Code oblige employers to pay compensation for an employee’s death arising from employment and establish solidary liability between the employer and a negligent fellow-worker. Section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act similarly provides that the right to compensation is not defeated by the negligence of a fellow servant.
Taken together, these provisions reasonably indicate that in compensation cases, the liability of business partners or co-owners should be solidary. A contrary rule (making liability merely joint) could defeat or cripple the employee’s right to compensation if one of the obligors were insolvent. This would be contrary to the intent and purpose of the Act, which must be construed liberally in favor of the employee and their dependents. Furthermore, Article 1207 of the New Civil Code provides that solidarity exists when the law or the nature of the obligation requires it. Given that the Workmen’s Compensation Act was enacted to give full protection to the employee, the nature of the employers’ obligation to pay compensation requires solidarity to attain the law’s purpose.
DISSENTING OPINION (Justice Alex Reyes):
The dissenting opinion argues that whether regarded as co-partners or co-owners, the defendants’ liability should only be pro rata under the Civil Code (Articles 485 and 1815). The Workmen’s Compensation Act does not change this nature of liability either expressly or by implication. To hold otherwise is to legislate. The dissent illustrates the potential injustice: if one co-owner owns 99% and the other 1%, holding the latter solidarily liable for 100% of the obligation despite only a 1% interest would be illogical and inequitable.