G.R. No. L-12084; August 25, 1958
Pedro Samson, et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Nicasio Yatco, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V, Quezon City, Florencia Cruz Vda. de Guzman, Maria Santos, The Phil. Realty Corp., Gregorio Velasquez, Register of Deeds of Rizal and The Sheriff of Quezon City, respondents.

FACTS

Pedro Samson, Florencia Cruz Vda. de Guzman, and Maria Santos were occupants of Lot No. 10, Block No. 45 of the Grace Park Subdivision, owned by the Philippine Realty Corporation. De Guzman and Santos purchased the lot on installment on March 21, 1951. Samson allegedly agreed to pay part of the down payment and monthly installments for the portion he occupied but failed to do so, with De Guzman and Santos shouldering all payments until the final payment on December 3, 1954.
On January 16, 1955, Samson filed a complaint (Civil Case No. Q-1314) against De Guzman, Santos, and the Philippine Realty Corporation, alleging a partition agreement dated June 15, 1951, that divided the lot, giving him the portion he occupied. He prayed for execution of a document recognizing this partition or for the corporation to approve it, and for reimbursement of excess payments.
The parties submitted an “Amicable Settlement” approved by the court on December 15, 1955. It divided the lot, assigning one-fourth (1/4) to Samson and the remainder to De Guzman and Santos. Samson was to pay for the segregation of his share and reimburse the defendants P1,321.66 with interest, deducting P338.64 already paid. Paragraph 10 of the agreement stipulated that segregation must be commenced by Samson within three months from receipt of the decision, failing which he would automatically lose all rights to the lot, and the defendants would return the amount he paid.
On January 7, 1956, Samson sold his rights to the 1/4 portion to his son-in-law, Mariano Reyes, via a public instrument. On January 17, 1956, Samson paid De Guzman and Santos P1,418.30 for his share.
On May 8, 1956, De Guzman and Santos filed a motion to cancel Samson’s rights, alleging his failure to comply with Paragraph 10 by not commencing segregation within three months. On May 12, 1956, the court, with Samson absent, ordered the cancellation of his rights and directed the defendants to return the amount received. Samson’s motion for reconsideration, citing difficulties with the National Urban Planning Commission and requesting an extension, was denied on June 9, 1956.
On August 22, 1956, De Guzman and Santos filed another motion, noting that a subdivision plan dated March 4, 1956, was submitted but was in the name of Mariano Reyes, not Samson. They prayed for issuance of title in their names and to deposit Samson’s payment in court. The court granted this on September 1, 1956.
On January 16, 1957, defendants moved for Samson to vacate. The court ordered him to vacate on January 19, 1957, and directed the sheriff to place defendants in possession.
On February 6, 1957, Samson filed two motions: one for reconsideration of the June 9 and September 1, 1956 orders, arguing compliance with Paragraph 10 as the blue-print was dated within the period and it was immaterial that it was in Reyes’ name; and another to reconsider the January 19, 1957 order, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction to issue a possessory order as the action was not for ejectment. On February 22, 1957, the court denied the first motion as the orders had become final and the second for lack of merit. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on February 26, 1957, for being a second motion without leave.
Samson and Reyes then filed this certiorari action, seeking to annul the various orders and for a preliminary injunction, which was granted.

ISSUE

Whether the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Samson’s motion for reconsideration of the orders dated June 9 and September 1, 1956, and in issuing the order of January 19, 1957, directing him to vacate the property.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the challenged orders and making the preliminary injunction permanent.
1. On the Denial of the Motion for Reconsideration (Orders of June 9 and September 1, 1956): The Court held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion. The amicable settlement, approved as a judgment, required Samson to “commence” the segregation within three months. The submission of a subdivision plan dated March 4, 1956, which was within the three-month period (the decision was received around December 20, 1955), constituted substantial compliance. The agreement did not specify that the segregation must be completed or that the plan must be in Samson’s name alone. The act of commencing segregation could be performed by Samson or his representative. Since Mariano Reyes was Samson’s successor-in-interest by virtue of the sale, the segregation initiated by Reyes inured to Samson’s benefit. Therefore, Samson did not violate Paragraph 10, and the lower court’s orders cancelling his rights and granting title to the defendants were null and void.
2. On the Order to Vacate (Order of January 19, 1957): The Court held that the lower court acted without jurisdiction. The original complaint was not an action for ejectment or unlawful detainer but one for specific performance and recognition of rights under a partition agreement. The judgment based on the amicable settlement did not contain a directive for Samson to vacate. A court cannot issue execution for matters not expressly adjudged in the judgment. The order to vacate and place defendants in possession constituted an amendment to the final judgment, which is beyond the court’s authority once a judgment has become final.
Dissenting Opinion (Justice Labrador, concurred in by Justice Bengzon):
The dissent argued that the orders of June 9 and September 1, 1956, had become final and executory and were binding not only on Samson but also on his successor-in-interest, Mariano Reyes. A judgment in a real action binds the parties and their successors-in-interest. Reyes, as purchaser, acquired no better rights than Samson had at the time of the conveyance, which were subject to the court’s judgment. The dissent expressed concern that allowing a defeated party to nullify a judgment by transferring rights to a non-party would set a dangerous precedent.