G.R. No. L-11885; March 29, 1957
AQUILINO BAUTISTA and MONICA MAGBUHAT, petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL P. BARCELONA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

On January 3, 1957, Moises Antenor and others (respondents) filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas against Aquilino Bautista and Monica Magbuhat (petitioners). Respondents claimed entitlement to a passage-way, 3 meters wide and 3.4 meters long, on a portion of Lot No. 133 of the Batangas Cadastral Survey, adjacent to D. Silang Street. They alleged that the lot originally belonged to Eugenia Zuñiga, who subdivided it into 11 portions, selling 10 to respondents and 1 to Ubaldo Magbuhat, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. Respondents asserted they had used the northern portion of petitioners’ lot as a passage-way for over 50 years to access D. Silang Street and essential establishments. They claimed that on December 27, 1956, petitioners, by strategy and stealth, closed this passage-way by building a stone wall and fence, depriving them of its use. Respondents prayed for a declaration of their right to the passage-way and for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to order the removal of the wall and maintain the status quo pending litigation.
Petitioners, in their answer, asserted ownership of the disputed portion under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11293. They admitted closing the passage-way on December 27, 1956, due to inconvenience and annoyance caused by respondents and the public. They contended this closure caused no prejudice to respondents because their lots abut a separate three-meter-wide street provided by the original owner since 1940, which connects to M.H. del Pilar Street, allowing access elsewhere. Petitioners denied respondents’ 50-year use, claiming respondents only began using it seven years ago when an adjacent lot occupied by a high school was closed to the public.
The respondent judge, based on the verified complaint alleging great inconvenience and irreparable injury, granted ex parte a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on January 5, 1957. The writ ordered petitioners to remove the stone wall within 48 hours and maintain the status quo. Petitioners filed a motion to set aside the writ, which was denied on January 7, 1957. Petitioners then filed this petition for certiorari to set aside the writ and the denial order.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ex parte.

RULING

Yes, the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the orders.
The Court noted that while the Rules of Court (Rule 60, section 1) expressly provide only for preventive injunctions, mandatory injunctions have been upheld in Philippine jurisprudence. However, a mandatory injunction, which commands a positive act (like demolishing a wall), does more than maintain the status quo and should not issue prior to final hearing except in cases of extreme urgency. Citing Manila Electric Railroad & Light Co. vs. Del Rosario and Jose, 22 Phil. 433, the Court reiterated the stringent conditions for issuing a preliminary mandatory injunction: extreme urgency; a very clear right; strong considerations of relative inconvenience in complainant’s favor; a willful and unlawful invasion of right against protest; a continuing injury; and where the injunction re-establishes a preexisting relation recently and arbitrarily interrupted.
Applying these conditions, the Court found the respondents’ claim did not present a clear, indubitable case. The right claimed was disputed: respondents alleged over 50 years of use, while petitioners claimed only 7 years. The lot in question was covered by a Torrens title in petitioners’ name. Respondents’ lots abutted another street provided for their use, leading to a public highway, casting doubt on the necessity of the claimed easement of right of way. Given these disputes, the respondents’ right was not so clear as to justify the extreme remedy of a preliminary mandatory injunction issued ex parte, without hearing the petitioners. The Court also noted it would have been proper for the judge to lift the writ after petitioners offered to file a counterbond double the amount of respondents’ bond.
Therefore, the issuance of the writ constituted an abuse of discretion. The orders of January 5 and January 7, 1957, were set aside. No costs were awarded.