G.R. No. 11728 , October 28, 1916
MARCELINA CABUÑAG, petitioner, vs. VICENTE JOCSON, as judge of first instance of the Thirteenth Judicial District, respondent.

FACTS:
Petitioner Marcelina Cabuñag was convicted of a misdemeanor in the justice’s court of Rosario, Batangas, and appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Batangas. The case was remitted to the CFI on August 11, 1915. The provincial fiscal filed an information on October 19, 1915, and trial was held on March 8, 1916, resulting in conviction. Cabuñag contended that prescription had extinguished her criminal liability under Articles 130 and 131 of the Penal Code, which provide that misdemeanors prescribe in two months and that prescription is interrupted by commencement of proceedings but recommences if proceedings are suspended without the accused’s fault. She argued that the period from August 11 to October 19, 1915 (two months and eight days), and the subsequent delay until March 1916, constituted such suspension, causing prescription to run. She sought certiorari to annul the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether the delays in the prosecution of the misdemeanor case, under the reorganized judicial system, resulted in prescription of the crime under Articles 130 and 131 of the Penal Code, thereby extinguishing criminal liability.

RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. The Court held that the delays did not constitute the kind of suspension or abandonment of proceedings that would trigger prescription under the Penal Code. The delay was not due to negligence of prosecuting officials but was a consequence of the restructured judicial system under American sovereignty, where courts hold sessions during fixed periods rather than continuously. The CFI of Batangas, part of the 13th Judicial District, had regular sessions beginning in February and August each year, and the case was calendared for the next regular session in February 1916. Given the absence of negligence and the administrative exigencies of the new judicial schedule, the spirit of Articles 130 and 131 did not warrant extinguishment of liability. The Court declined to rule on whether certiorari was the proper remedy or whether the Penal Code provisions had been repealed, deciding the case on its merits to expedite resolution.