G.R. No. L-11595; September 29, 1958
Domingo Doctor, petitioner-appellee, vs. Justice of the Peace, Camiling, Tarlac and Leocadia Sapinoro, respondents-appellants.

FACTS

On February 13, 1954, Leocadia Sapinoro filed a complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court of Camiling, Tarlac (Civil Case No. 141) to recover P638.00 plus P150.00 as attorney’s fees from Domingo Doctor. Summons was duly served, requiring Doctor to appear and answer on February 25, 1954. On that date, Doctor appeared and moved for a postponement, alleging a possible settlement. The hearing was reset to March 8, 1954, and both parties were notified. Doctor failed to appear on March 8. After hearing Sapinoro’s evidence, the justice of the peace, on the same day, rendered a judgment declaring Doctor in default and ordering him to pay the amounts claimed. On March 15, 1954, Doctor filed a motion to lift the order of default and to set aside the judgment, explaining his absence was due to an erroneous belief the matter was settled. On September 8, 1954, the court denied the motion. On September 27, 1954, Doctor moved for reconsideration. Sapinoro opposed and petitioned for execution, asserting the decision had become final. On November 5, 1954, the justice of the peace denied reconsideration and granted the petition for execution, issuing the writ the next day. On November 18, 1954, Doctor filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. Sapinoro contended appeal was the proper remedy and there was no excess of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion. The CFI judge annulled the “judgment by default” and all subsequent orders, including the writ of execution, holding that since Doctor had appeared on February 25, the order of default was illegal and void, rendering everything thereafter likewise illegal and void. The CFI also stated that, according to Carballo vs. Encarnacion, a decision by default from an inferior court is not appealable.

ISSUE

1. Whether the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus was the proper remedy, given the availability of an appeal or other remedies.
2. Whether the justice of the peace acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in declaring Doctor in default, proceeding with the ex-parte hearing, rendering judgment, and later issuing the writ of execution.

RULING

The Supreme Court REVERSED the decision of the Court of First Instance and DISMISSED the special civil action, upholding the proceedings in the justice of the peace court, including the order of execution.
1. On the Propriety of the Special Civil Action: The petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus was improper. The Court held that Doctor had other adequate remedies. Citing Carballo vs. Encarnacion, the Court clarified that a judgment rendered after an ex-parte hearing due to a defendant’s absence (despite proper notice and a prior appearance) is not a true judgment by default and is therefore appealable. Furthermore, a defendant declared in default could file a motion for relief under Rule 38 (on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable neglect) and appeal from its denial. Since Doctor could have appealed but did not, he could not use certiorari as a substitute for a lost appeal. The Court also noted his petition for relief under Rule 38 would have been filed out of time.
2. On Jurisdiction and Abuse of Discretion: The justice of the peace had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the person of the defendant. There was no excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
* Regarding the Declaration of Default: The declaration of default was erroneous because Doctor had previously appeared. However, this was a harmless error. Since Doctor had been properly notified of the March 8 hearing, the court could validly proceed with an ex-parte hearing and render judgment in his absence, as held in Quizon vs. Arellano and Veluz vs. Justice of the Peace of Sariaya. The erroneous default declaration did not vitiate the judgment, which was based on evidence heard after proper notice.
* Regarding the Denial of the Motion to Reopen: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the justice of the peace’s refusal to reopen the case, noting that Doctor’s motion was not supported by an affidavit of merit.
* Regarding the Issuance of the Writ of Execution: The decision had become final and executory by November 5, 1954. The period to appeal was not suspended indefinitely by Doctor’s motions. He learned of the denial of his first motion on September 19, 1954, and had 15 days to appeal. His failure to do so rendered the judgment final, making the issuance of the writ of execution proper.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court was dissolved. Costs were imposed on appellee Domingo Doctor.