G.R. No. L-11553; February 28, 1961
Demetria Mercado, petitioner-appellant, vs. The People of the Philippines, respondent-appellee.

FACTS

Demetria Mercado befriended pensioner Miguela San Angel. In May 1952, after San Angel received a P10,000 check, Mercado persuaded her to buy a house and lot from Martina Nebre for P8,000. San Angel agreed, with Mercado offering to advance P1,000 of the price, to be repaid by San Angel in installments from her pension plus P200 interest. On June 12, 1952, San Angel withdrew P1,999 from her bank account and, upon Mercado’s urging, entrusted the money to her for safekeeping.
The following day, the parties went to a notary public to execute the deed of sale. Upon review, the vendor and a witness noted that the deed named Mercado, not San Angel, as the vendee. When San Angel expressed concern, Mercado assured her this was merely a formality and that the title would be transferred to San Angel after she completed repaying the P1,000 advance. Relying on this assurance, San Angel raised no further objection. The deed was signed, reflecting a P3,000 price, though only P1,544 was actually paid to the vendor at that time, with Mercado undertaking to pay the P1,000 balance to the vendor by year’s end.

ISSUE

Whether Mercado is guilty of estafa through misappropriation or conversion.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for estafa. The legal logic centers on the elements of deceit and misappropriation. Mercado’s act of causing the deed to be executed in her own name, despite San Angel being the true buyer who supplied the purchase money, constituted deceit. Her subsequent assurances to San Angel were false, intended to lull her into inaction. Crucially, Mercado later sold the same property to a third party, Federico Simsuangco, in May 1953, and retained the proceeds. This act of selling and keeping the price constituted clear evidence of misappropriation and conversion of the property held in trust for San Angel.
The Court rejected Mercado’s defense that her initial financial advance gave her a legitimate interest in the property, noting that San Angel had already repaid that advance with interest before the sale to Simsuangco. The Court also dismissed the procedural objection that the subsequent sale was not alleged in the information, as it was proven by Mercado’s own testimony and served as corroborative evidence of the conversion alleged in the charge. Thus, all elements of estafa were present: (1) Mercado received money and property in trust for a specific purpose (to buy the property for San Angel); (2) she employed deceit by having the title placed in her name under false pretenses; and (3) she misappropriated the property by selling it for her own benefit. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was affirmed.