G.R. No. L-11536; October 31, 1960
TOMAS B. VILLAMIN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS and THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Tomas B. Villamin sought a review of a resolution from the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) dated July 31, 1956, which dismissed his petition for review of a decision by the Collector of Internal Revenue regarding sales tax assessments on logs sold from 1948-1950 and 1951-1954. The Collector issued several letters of demand to Villamin, including those dated June 7, 1955, December 12, 1955, and February 13, 1956. Prior to these, on February 10, 1955, Villamin requested reconsideration of the assessment. The Acting Chief of the Assessment Department denied this request in a letter dated June 7, 1955, received by Villamin on August 18, 1955. Villamin then wrote another letter on September 2, 1955, offering an amicable settlement, which was denied by the Collector on December 12, 1955 (received January 9, 1956). Villamin again requested reconsideration on January 9, 1956, which was denied on February 13, 1956 (received February 29, 1956). Villamin filed his petition for review with the CTA on April 2, 1956. The Collector moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 30-day period prescribed by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 , which the CTA sustained.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Tax Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for review on the ground that it was filed beyond the 30-day period for appeal, specifically in computing the period from August 18, 1955 (the date of receipt of the first denial letter dated June 7, 1955) rather than from February 29, 1956 (the date of receipt of the last denial letter dated February 13, 1956).

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals. The 30-day period for appeal to the CTA under Sections 7 and 11 of Republic Act No. 1125 begins to run from the taxpayer’s receipt of the first letter from the Collector of Internal Revenue that denies the request for reconsideration or cancellation of the original assessment. This letter constitutes the appealable “decision” on the disputed assessment. Applying this rule, the period commenced on August 18, 1955 (receipt of the June 7, 1955 denial), was interrupted by Villamin’s subsequent request for reconsideration on September 2, 1955, and resumed on February 29, 1956 (receipt of the February 13, 1956 denial). The total elapsed time from August 18, 1955, to September 2, 1955 (15 days), and from February 29, 1956, to April 2, 1956 (33 days), amounted to 48 days, exceeding the 30-day statutory period. Therefore, the petition was filed out of time. The Court cited precedents (Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. Blaquera and St. Stephen’s Association, et al. vs. The Collector of Internal Revenue) to support this computation. The Court also rejected the contention that the June 7, 1955 letter was not a valid decision, noting that the signing official was authorized under a Bureau of Internal Revenue memorandum order, and subsequent letters from the Collector affirmed the assessment.