G.R. No. L-11435, December 27, 1957.
HON. MATEO L. ALCASID, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Albay, ANTONIO CONDA, as regular administrator of the estate of Jose V. Samson, JOSEFINA N. SAMSON, GLENDA SAMSON, MANUEL SAMSON and FELIX SAMSON, petitioners, vs. AMADO V. SAMSON, JESUS V. SAMSON, PURIFICACION SAMSON MORALES, DOLORES SAMSON-ACAYAN and PAZ SAMSON-YOROBE, respondents.

FACTS

On October 18, 1954, respondents filed an application for letters of administration for the estate of Jose V. Samson, and Jesus V. Samson was appointed special administrator. Petitioners (the widow and minor children) opposed and sought administration for the widow. After almost two years of hearing, Judge Alcasid, on March 12, 1956, appointed Antonio Conda, Municipal Treasurer of Libon, Albay, as regular administrator, ordering the special administrator to turn over the estate properties and funds. Conda qualified and letters of administration were issued on March 19, 1956. On April 3, 1956, the court ordered the special administrator to deliver the properties within three days. Respondents appealed the appointment order on March 27, 1956, and their record on appeal was approved on April 17, 1956. They also moved to set aside Conda’s bond and letters, which was denied on May 9, 1956. The Court of Appeals, upon certiorari, set aside Conda’s appointment and annulled his bond, ruling that the appointment order was stayed by the appeal and that a special administrator could be appointed pending appeal if the current one was unfit. Petitioners sought review by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance abused its discretion in appointing a regular administrator and ordering the special administrator to turn over the estate properties pending appeal.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The appointment and removal of a special administrator are interlocutory and lie within the sound discretion of the court. Under Rule 81, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the power of a special administrator ceases upon the grant of letters testamentary or of administration to a regular administrator, who must be delivered the estate. The court’s orders of March 12 and May 9, 1956, showed good reasons to terminate the special administration, as the proceeding had been pending for over one and a half years, conflict among heirs was bitter, and a disinterested administrator would be conducive to a smooth administration. These reasons justified immediate execution of the appointment order pending appeal under Rule 39, Section 2, even if not expressly stated in the turnover order of April 3, 1956. The special administrator was not removed but superseded by operation of law upon the regular administrator’s appointment. No abuse of discretion was found. The Supreme Court ordered the dismissal of the original petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.