GR L 11335; (October, 1958) (2) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-11335 and G.R. No. L-11450; October 30, 1958
SANTIAGO GANGCAYCO and MANUEL GANGCAYCO, petitioners, vs. HON. EMILIO BENITEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch II, ALIPIO N. CASILAN and PURITA GALAGNARA, respondents. (and) RAYMOND TOMASSI, SANTIAGO GANGCAYCO, and MANUEL GANGCAYCO, petitioners, vs. HON. EMILIO BENITEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch II, ALIPIO N. CASILAN and PURITA GALAGNARA, respondents.
FACTS
This case consolidates two petitions for certiorari and mandamus. The petitioners (Santiago Gangcayco, Manuel Gangcayco, and Raymond Tomassi) were defendants in two civil cases originally filed by respondents Alipio N. Casilan and Purita Galagnara in the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiuan, Samar (Civil Case No. 39 for recovery of personal property and Civil Case No. 40 for recovery of possession). The Supreme Court had previously reversed an order of the Court of First Instance of Samar dismissing these cases on appeal and remanded them for further proceedings. On May 15, 1956, the trial court again dismissed the appeals, ruling that because the defendants had been in default in the justice of the peace court, they lost their right to appeal, citing the Court of Appeals case of Canlas vs. David. The defendants’ motions for reconsideration were denied on September 17, 1956.
The factual record from the justice of the peace court shows:
1. In Civil Case No. 39, Manuel Gangcayco received the summons. On the initial hearing date (April 26, 1950), he personally appeared, answered the complaint, and joined the plaintiffs’ counsel in asking for a postponement. The hearing was reset. His counsel later filed motions for postponement for the subsequent hearing dates.
2. In Civil Case No. 40, all petitioners received the summons. Petitioner Tomassi filed a motion to dismiss the complaint before the initial hearing. The court denied this motion and reset the hearing.
3. On the final scheduled hearing date (June 7, 1950), the petitioners or their counsel did not appear. The justice of the peace court denied a last-minute motion for continuance, proceeded to hear the plaintiffs’ evidence, and rendered judgment.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners, having made appearances in the justice of the peace court but failing to appear on the final hearing date, were in default such that they lost their right to appeal the judgments to the Court of First Instance.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the writs prayed for. The petitioners were not in default. The Court set aside the trial court’s orders of May 15, 1956, and September 17, 1956, and directed the respondent court to proceed with the trial of the two appealed cases.
The ruling is based on the interpretation of Section 13, Rule 4 (now pertaining to rules of procedure in inferior courts), which states that in justice of the peace and municipal courts, a defendant may be declared in default only for failure to appear in the civil case, not for failure to answer the complaint. Appearance may be made personally, by counsel, or in writing.
Applying this rule to the facts:
Manuel Gangcayco had personally appeared and answered the complaint.
Santiago Gangcayco had appeared by joining in the motion for postponement.
* Raymond Tomassi had appeared by filing a motion to dismiss.
Therefore, despite their non-appearance on the specific day the cases were heard, their prior valid appearances precluded a declaration of default. Consequently, they retained their right to appeal the adverse judgments to the Court of First Instance. The trial court erred in dismissing their appeals on the ground of default.
