G.R. No. L-1131; May 31, 1947
JUAN JAMORA, petitioner, vs. MANUEL BLANCO, Judge of First Instance of Iloilo, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Juan Jamora filed an original action for certiorari seeking to annul the order of respondent Judge Manuel Blanco of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dated October 18, 1946. That order dismissed Special Proceeding No. 36 (the intestate estate proceeding for the deceased Gorgonia Jamora Vda. de Mapa, initiated by Juan Jamora) and set aside all prior proceedings. The respondent judge based his order on his personal knowledge that the estate of the deceased had already been settled and distributed according to a will probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila approximately fifteen years earlier. When required to explain, the petitioner admitted he had instituted the intestate proceeding in Iloilo because the records of the Manila testate proceedings were destroyed during the war. The petitioner contends the judge acted illegally by relying on personal knowledge of facts not supported by evidence.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the intestate proceeding based on his personal knowledge and the petitioner’s admissions, without a formal hearing.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari. The Court held that while the respondent judge was hasty, the petitioner was not deprived of his day in court. The lack of a formal hearing was more than supplied by the petitioner’s own admissions in his petition for certiorari, which confirmed the existence of the prior testate proceedings in Manila, the destruction of those records, and the absence of a petition for reconstitution. These admissions aligned with what the petitioner reportedly confirmed at the hearing on October 15, 1946. The proper remedy for the petitioner is to file a petition for reconstitution of the records in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The possibility that reconstitution might be difficult or that he lacks sufficient documents is not a valid excuse for bypassing that procedure; other interested parties may succeed, and if reconstitution proves impossible, the court can order a new trial or permit a new action. Costs were awarded against the petitioner.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Perfecto dissented. He found the respondent judge’s procedure highly arbitrary. The hearing on October 15, 1946, was set motu proprio without notice to other heirs, no stenographic notes were taken, and the order of dismissal relied principally on the judge’s personal knowledge, which he erroneously considered “almost of judicial knowledge.” Judicial knowledge is limited to universally known facts, not a judge’s personal recollection of specific cases. The proper procedure would have been for the judge to take the witness stand if he wished to testify to these facts, with another judge hearing the case. Justice Perfecto concluded the order was issued with abuse of judicial power and should be annulled, granting the petition.