G.R. No. L-11302; October 28, 1960
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BENJAMIN AGUILAR Y PEREZ and JOSE OLIVEROS Y OLAT, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

On June 24, 1955, an information was filed in the Municipal Court of Manila charging defendants-appellees Benjamin Aguilar and Jose Oliveros with the crime of multiple slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The information alleged that on April 25, 1955, in Manila, the accused, while driving their respective vehicles, operated them in a careless, reckless, and imprudent manner, causing a collision. As a result, five passengers sustained physical injuries requiring medical attendance for more than one but not more than nine days, incapacitating them from their customary labor for the same period. The defendants filed motions to quash the information on the ground that reckless imprudence is punishable only if the acts constitute a grave or less grave felony. The municipal court granted the motion. The City Fiscal appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, which sustained the order granting the motions to quash and dismissed the case. The People appealed this order of dismissal.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the case on the ground that the facts alleged in the information did not constitute an offense, as the law (Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code) did not provide a penalty for an act of reckless imprudence which, if intentional, would constitute only a light felony (such as slight physical injuries).

RULING

Yes, the trial court erred. The order of dismissal is set aside and the case is remanded for hearing on the merits.
The Court examined Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, which at the time punished: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in a grave or less grave felony; (2) simple imprudence resulting in a grave or less grave felony; (3) negligent acts resulting in property damage; and (4) simple imprudence resulting in a light felony. The article did not expressly punish an act of reckless imprudence which, if intentional, would constitute only a light felony. The rule of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius applied, and the legislature later filled this gap in 1957 via Republic Act No. 1790 .
However, applying the precedent in People vs. Benigno Lingad, the Court held that the information in this case, while designating the crime as “slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence,” contained allegations describing the act in a manner that did not definitively specify the degree of negligence. The body of the information alleged the act was committed “in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner.” This vague allegation allowed for the inference that the act could have been committed through either reckless or simple negligence. Since simple negligence resulting in a light felony is punishable under Article 365, and because what is graver (reckless negligence) includes the lighter (simple negligence), the information did not necessarily allege a non-existent crime. The determination of the precise degree of negligence is a matter of evidence to be presented at trial. Therefore, the motion to quash should not have been granted.