GR L 11282; (November, 1958) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-11282; November 29, 1958
MANUEL I. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMADEO GONZALES and DELFINA CARIÑO, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Manuel I. Gonzales was the administrator of the estate of his deceased father, Alejandro Gonzales y Tolentino, from around 1938 to 1943. On November 5, 1943, the widow and other heirs, through an amicable settlement, fixed his administrator’s fees and commissions at P11,000. This settlement was approved by the court on May 21, 1948. On July 28, 1949, Gonzales obtained a writ of execution to satisfy the amount, and on September 23, 1949, he secured an alias writ of execution. Pursuant to this, the deputy provincial sheriff of Pangasinan levied upon a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1234. The shares of Pedro Gonzales, Amadeo Gonzales, Delfina Cariño, Loreto Esguerra, Rodolfo Penson, and Alfonso Penson in the land were sold at public auction on June 17, 1950, with petitioner Manuel I. Gonzales as the highest bidder for P2,307.46.
On October 7, 1951, respondent Amadeo Gonzales filed an action to set aside the sale of his share, alleging he did not participate in the compromise agreement, that the levy was fraudulent due to lack of notice of the motions leading to the alias writ, and that the sale was null because the procedure for payment under the amicable settlement and Rules 89 and 90 of the Rules of Court was not followed. Petitioner objected and moved to confirm the sale. A similar petition was filed by respondent Delfina Cariño on June 26, 1953, which petitioner moved to strike out.
The trial court held that the amicable settlement and its approval were valid, but that the levy, notice of sale, and sale of the shares of Amadeo Gonzales and Delfina Cariño were improperly made and thus null and void. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which refused to consider his first three assignments of error—which involved questions of fact—due to the absence of the transcript of hearing and documentary evidence in the records forwarded. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s decision, citing Section 6 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court as an additional ground for the invalidity of the levy and sale.
ISSUE
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider petitioner’s first three assignments of error due to the absence of evidence in the records.
2. Whether the levy and sale on execution of the respondents’ shares in the property were valid.
3. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the petitions of Amadeo Gonzales and Delfina Cariño for annulment of the levy and sale.
RULING
1. On the refusal to consider assignments of error: The Supreme Court found that while the Rules of Court require the clerk of the trial court to forward evidence with the record on appeal, and petitioner had the right to expect this, the evidence was not transmitted. However, petitioner’s counsel failed to demand from the Court of Appeals an order to require the clerk to forward the evidence or file a timely motion for reconsideration to address the missing evidence. Thus, it was too late to seek reversal on this ground in the Supreme Court, as errors not raised in the court below are not considered.
2. On the validity of the levy and sale: The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the levy and sale were invalid. The trial court found as a fact that respondents Amadeo Gonzales and Delfina Cariño had not actually received their shares in the property levied upon. This finding was binding, as the Court of Appeals relied on it due to the absence of evidence to the contrary. The citation of Section 6 of Rule 89 by the Court of Appeals was merely an additional, non-prejudicial reason supporting the invalidity. The key issue was factual—whether respondents received their shares—and the trial court’s finding that they did not was upheld.
3. On the trial court’s jurisdiction: The Supreme Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the petitions. The levy was issued pursuant to an order of the probate court dated August 23, 1948. While such an action could be filed in any competent court, it was permissible to bring it before the probate court itself, as it directly involved compliance with its own order.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, with costs against petitioner.
