G.R. No. L-11229; March 29, 1958
MANUEL DIAZ, CONSTANCIA DIAZ and SOR PETRA DIAZ, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. CARMEN GORRICHO and her husband FRANCISCO AGUADO, defendants-appellees.

FACTS

Lots Nos. 1941 and 3073 originally belonged to the conjugal partnership of spouses Francisco Diaz and Maria Sevilla. Francisco Diaz died in 1919, survived by his widow and their three children (the plaintiffs-appellants). In 1935, defendant-appellee Carmen Gorricho filed an action against Maria Sevilla, and a writ of attachment was issued upon Maria Sevilla’s shares in the lots. The parcels were sold at public auction to Gorricho. After Maria Sevilla failed to redeem, the sheriff executed a final deed of sale in favor of Gorricho. However, this deed erroneously conveyed the whole of the lots instead of only Maria Sevilla’s half-interest. Pursuant to this deed, Gorricho obtained Transfer Certificates of Title in her name on April 13, 1937, and possessed the lands as owner. Maria Sevilla died in November 1951. In March 1952, her children filed an action to compel defendants to execute a deed of reconveyance over the undivided one-half interest (their deceased father’s share) allegedly held in trust for them. The trial court held that while a constructive trust in plaintiffs’ favor arose, their action was barred by laches and prescription.

ISSUE

Whether the plaintiffs-appellants’ action to enforce a constructive trust and compel reconveyance of their father’s half-interest in the properties is barred by laches and prescription.

RULING

Yes, the action is barred. The Court affirmed the judgment of dismissal. While a constructive trust arose in favor of the appellants when Gorricho took advantage of the sheriff’s error and obtained title to the whole property, such constructive trusts, unlike express trusts, are barred by laches and prescription. The reason is that in constructive trusts, there is no promise or fiduciary relation; the trustee does not recognize any trust, so the beneficiary is not justified in delaying action. The appellants’ cause of action accrued in 1937 upon the issuance and recording of the titles to Gorricho. They allowed fifteen years to elapse before filing suit in 1952. Even considering the minority of the youngest appellant (who became of age in 1939), more than sufficient time (thirteen years) had elapsed, which extinguished their action under the then-governing Code of Civil Procedure, where the longest prescriptive period was ten years.