G.R. No. L-10952; May 30, 1958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. BENIGNO LINGAD Y VITO, defendant-appellee.

FACTS

On October 30, 1954, Benigno Lingad y Vito was charged before the Municipal Court of Manila with the crime of “slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.” After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The accused appealed to the Court of First Instance. There, he filed a motion to quash the information. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case, holding that the crime of slight physical injuries when committed through reckless imprudence is not punishable by law. The trial court relied on a Court of Appeals decision (People vs. Macario Ande y Marino), which held that the law does not penalize an act committed through reckless imprudence if the intentional act would only constitute a light felony. The Government appealed the dismissal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in granting the motion to quash and dismissing the case on the ground that slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence is not punishable by law.

RULING

Yes, the trial court erred. The Supreme Court set aside the appealed order and directed the case to be remanded to the trial court for hearing on the merits.
The Court held that while the information designated the crime as “slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence,” the body of the information did not definitively specify the degree of negligence. It alleged the accused drove “in a careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner.” This vague allegation could refer to either reckless or simple negligence. The Court reasoned that the elements of both kinds of negligence are similar, differing only in degree, which is a matter of evidence to be presented at trial. Furthermore, even if reckless imprudence was alleged, it could still be shown during trial that the act was committed only through simple negligence, as the graver includes the lighter. Therefore, the information did not necessarily charge a non-existent crime, and the matter should be resolved through a trial on the merits.
Separate Opinions:
* Justice J.B.L. Reyes concurred in the result, stating that in his opinion, the allegations of the information did charge reckless imprudence.
* Justice Felix, with Chief Justice Paras concurring, dissented on two grounds: (1) He believed the information clearly specified reckless imprudence by describing the acts constituting it (driving at an excessive speed without precautions). (2) He argued that remanding the case for trial would place the defendant in double jeopardy, as he had already been tried and convicted in the municipal court. He contended that constitutional protection against double jeopardy cannot be waived.